

CURRENT HISTORY

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Current History

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In the 1980's, the nations of South Asia figure prominently in the strategies of both the United States and the Soviet Union. As our introductory article points out, "Superpower interest in South Asia is likely to persist . . . [but] a political settlement of the Afghan issue, including a Soviet withdrawal, would dramatically decrease tensions in the area and between the superpowers."

The Strategic Significance of South Asia

BY ZALMAY KHALILZAD

Assistant Professor of Political Science, Columbia University

SOUTH ASIA is in an era of historic transformation, facing multiple and interactive threats. These include the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the possibility that the Russian-Afghan war may spread to Pakistan; the regional rivalries and conflicts between India and Pakistan, including the possibility of a "nuclear crawl" between them; internal instabilities caused by crises of social justice, political participation and national integration; and renewed and intensified superpower competition. Although the role of the superpowers in the area is likely to remain impressive, their relations with the countries of the region are inherently unstable.

The Soviet Union has important interests in South Asia. The region has been the object of its sustained interest since the mid-1950's, not only because of the territorial contiguity of the region to the Soviet Union, but also in the context of Moscow's competition for influence with China and the United States. Moscow has approached its rivalry with China and the United States in the area as a zero-sum game. In the 1950's, as the West sought close anti-Soviet and anti-Chinese allies, Moscow took advantage of Indian and Afghan hostility toward Pakistan and developed friendly relations with both countries.

¹The coup was carried out by a coalition of the two rival factions of the People's Democratic party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Soon the Parcham faction (headed by Babrak Karmal) was eliminated and the Khalqis (headed by Nur Mohammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin) emerged victorious. Louis Dupree, "Afghanistan Under Khalq," *Problems of Communism*, July-August, 1979, pp. 34-50. Hannah Negaran (pseud.), "The Afghan Coup of April 1978: Revolution and International Security," *ORBIS*, Spring, 1979, pp. 93-113.

Moscow's break with China significantly increased the importance of India in Soviet calculations. The Sino-Indian war of 1962 was followed by Moscow's increased importance to New Delhi. Since the mid-1960's, India's desire to achieve regional domination in South Asia and to strengthen itself against China has coincided with the Soviet Union's anti-Chinese policies and its desire to pressure Pakistan, a country with close ties with both China and the United States. Moscow has continued to encourage Delhi to maintain a hard line against China. However, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a lively debate has developed in India about the future of Indo-Soviet relations.

In the case of Afghanistan, since 1955 Soviet policies appear, *prima facie*, paradoxical. The Afghan pattern may well be characteristic of Soviet policies toward small contiguous states. The Soviet Union's level of activity, including the military invasion of small countries on its borders, apparently increases as the ideology of such countries and the Soviet Union converges. This Soviet tendency has worrisome and instructive implications not only for Pakistan but also for Iran and Turkey. Although Soviet involvement in Afghanistan goes back many years, it increased substantially after April, 1978, when Khalq, a Marxist-Leninist group, carried out a coup.¹ The new government initiated radical changes in Afghanistan's external and internal policies. Externally, the new government moved decidedly closer to the Soviet Union. However, the Khalq government began to face large-scale internal opposition. Over time this opposition turned into a major anti-regime insurgency.

There have been many speculations about the reasons for the Soviet invasion. It is possible that those

participating in the decision favored intervention for varying reasons. Nevertheless, on the pretext of an invitation from the regime that had allegedly overthrown the Khalqi government, the Soviet military entered the country in force. Whatever the Soviet motive, the invasion had far-reaching regional and global implications. It eliminated a buffer state and brought Soviet forces to the border of Pakistan, one of the major South Asian countries. It set a new precedent for the massive use of Soviet forces outside the Soviet satellite empire and was the first application of the Brezhnev Doctrine* outside East Europe. On the strategic level, the Soviet occupation has increased Soviet ability to project power to South Asia, the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf. With Afghan bases, the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf are within the range of Soviet tactical aircraft. This increased capability followed the great expansion of the Soviet navy in the Indian Ocean over the past 25 years.

Once in Afghanistan, Soviet leaders initiated a multipronged strategy for the pacification of the country. Efforts have been made to accommodate Islamic feelings; there has been a propaganda blitz to win support for the Soviet position both in Afghanistan and abroad; and blame for the Afghan crisis has been assigned to the Americans, the Chinese and the Pakistanis. Attempts have been made to harmonize relations between the two PDPA factions and to broaden the base of government through the formation of the National Fatherland Front, an umbrella organization representing the various elements of the population. Moscow is also trying to train hundreds of Afghans who are expected to help not only in maintaining law and order but in running the country. The Soviet-installed regime has also attempted to win popular support by undoing some of the "radical" policies of the previous government. Moscow has tried to build loyal armed forces to turn the Soviet-Afghan war into an Afghan-Afghan war. The Soviet military strategy apparently consists of holding major cities and highways and applying force intermittently against the area of resistance in the countryside. The Soviet strategy is aimed at minimizing Soviet loss of life, and Soviet leaders believe that in time they will either discourage the population from supporting the resistance or force dissidents to leave the country.² Moscow is also apparently counting on the international community to forget the Afghan crisis.

The Soviet strategy has not been successful so far, and Moscow is far from pacifying the country. Violent

*In 1968, following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev declared the Soviet Union's inherent right to intervene in any "socialist" (Communist) country in order to preserve "socialism"; this statement is known as the Brezhnev Doctrine.

²On Soviet strategy see Zalmay Khalilzad, "Soviet Occupied Afghanistan," *Problems of Communism*, November-December, 1980.

opposition to the occupation has spread. Several factors will play a critical role in determining whether Soviet leaders succeed in liquidating or neutralizing the Afghan partisans. These include the policies of Pakistan toward the insurgents, the extent of external support for Afghan partisans and refugees, the success or failure of Soviet attempts to convert divisions among the insurgents into open conflict, Soviet efforts to establish a government in Kabul that commands a large armed force and has a wide base of support, and the scope and duration of the Soviet military commitment.

SOVIET POLICY IN PAKISTAN

Recognizing the importance of Pakistan in the Afghan conflict, Moscow has increased its attention to Pakistan. Soviet-Pakistani policies have traditionally been less than cordial. Pakistan's membership in Western alliances and its close relations with China have been a source of concern to the Soviet Union. In the 1960's and 1970's, Moscow encouraged Pakistan to weaken its ties with the People's Republic of China and the West and to follow the example of Afghanistan and India in pursuing a policy of Soviet-tilted neutrality. However, since the 1978 coup in Afghanistan, and especially since the 1979 invasion, the Soviet Union's desire to consolidate its position has led to a major deterioration in its relations with Pakistan. Pakistan led the international denunciation of the Soviet move, and Islamabad plays a critical role in determining the fate of the Afghan resistance. It has provided sanctuary for more than two million Afghan refugees, and it has allowed several Afghan resistance groups to operate in the country. By providing increased support for the groups fighting the Soviets, Pakistan can block Moscow's pacification strategy. On the other hand, Pakistan could help Moscow's cause if it recognized the Soviet-installed government in Kabul and moved against the partisans.

To date, Pakistan has resisted accommodating the Soviet Union; at the same time, Pakistan has not allowed a substantial improvement in the effectiveness of the Afghan fighters. The current Pakistani government does not favor the consolidation of Soviet power in Afghanistan, believing that such a development would enormously increase the Soviet Union's ability to influence developments in Pakistan. At the same time, Islamabad has not allowed a substantial improvement in the organizational and military capability of the Afghan resistance, fearing that such improvement would bring increased Soviet pressure on itself. The Pakistanis fear limited Soviet strikes against valued targets, the Soviet-Afghan occupation of Pakistani territory, and Soviet encouragement to India to increase pressure on Pakistan.

Thus far, Pakistan has allowed only a little assistance to the Afghans, so that the resistance can be kept alive;

it hopes for a political settlement that would involve Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.³ Islamabad is also hoping that because of the Afghan conflict it will receive substantial economic and military assistance, to increase its ability to resist Soviet or Indian pressure. President Zia ul-Haq's opponents have argued that he is using the Afghan crisis to consolidate his own position at home and to gain a greater acceptability abroad.

It is possible that current Pakistani policy might bring about the very situation it most fears: the consolidation of Soviet power in Afghanistan. Meager assistance to the resistance movement and the miserable living conditions of the Afghan refugees might lead to feelings of resignation and defeat among the Afghans and to a subsequent Soviet military victory.

To gain Pakistani cooperation on the Afghan crisis, Soviet leaders have applied considerable pressure, both positive and negative, on Islamabad. On the positive side, they reportedly have offered "security," the recognition of the Durand Line,** and even nuclear power plants in exchange for cooperation. Positive incentives have been accompanied by many threats. Soviet and Afghan aircraft have frequently violated Pakistani airspace, and Kabul has threatened to support political groups inside Pakistan opposed to the current regime. Kabul has already given refuge to some of President Zia's opponents, including Mir Murtaza Bhutto, the son of former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The Soviet Union's public posture on Pakistan has at times been very threatening. For example, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko has warned that if Pakistan continues to serve as a puppet of imperialism in the future, it will jeopardize its existence and its integrity as an independent state.

However, while Soviet statements have been heavy-handed, Soviet policy toward Pakistan has been cautious and prudent. The Soviet military has not attacked any major targets in Pakistan; and there is no evidence of major training and infiltration of the regime's political and ethnic opponents. The Soviet Union's caution may in part be due to its preoccupation with Afghanistan, a desire to maintain a dialogue with Pakistan, and the knowledge that Pakistan could make the Soviet role even more difficult in Afghanistan.

Besides pressuring Pakistan, Moscow has tried hard not to allow its action in Afghanistan to damage its

**Established by British official Sir Mortimer Durand in 1893, the Durand Line is the boundary between Pakistan's North-West Frontier and Afghanistan.

³Pakistan has agreed to a dialogue with the Karmal government to look for a political settlement of the Afghan conflict through the good offices of the United Nations. In February, 1981, U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim appointed Javier Pérez de Cuéllar as his representative to seek a political settlement. Newly elected Secretary General Cuéllar is expected to name his own representative.

⁴Kuldip Nayar, *Report on Afghanistan* (New Delhi: Allied Publishers Private Ltd., 1981).

relations with India and other states. Soviet leaders have discouraged other Indian Ocean states from moving close to the United States or allowing the United States to use their facilities. As for India, in 1980 Soviet leaders gave it high priority and regarded Indian goodwill as important. The Soviet Union sold New Delhi \$1.6 billion in arms at concessionary terms in 1980. Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev visited Delhi between December 8 and December 11, 1980, to underline the importance of India in Soviet policy; perhaps he also wanted to be seen in a major third world country in the aftermath of the Soviet move into Afghanistan, which had been condemned by most developing countries.

Soviet policy toward India has paid off. The official Indian attitude on Afghanistan has been ambivalent. On January 11, 1980, at the United Nations, India supported the Soviet position. Indian leaders believed that the Soviet move was a limited and temporary defensive move. Their response may be a function of several considerations. The Indian government may prefer the Soviet-installed government to an Islam-motivated government, which India may regard as the alternative. Premier Indira Gandhi may not have been displeased with the Soviet move, further, because it increased pressure on Pakistan. New Delhi may have hoped that Soviet pressure might make Islamabad more accommodating toward India. In addition, Gandhi probably believed that India could not antagonize Moscow, a treaty partner and partial ally. Many Indian officials believe that India needs Soviet support more than vice versa. This Indian attitude is likely to persist as long as the Sino-Indian dispute remains unresolved and Delhi sees no alternative for the type of assistance and security support that Moscow has been willing to provide. Indian leaders also believe that India can do very little to affect Soviet policy in Afghanistan because of the importance of the issue to the Soviet Union.

However, over time, India has modified its position, arguing that Afghanistan's independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty and nonaligned status must be preserved.⁴ Indian officials have privately expressed concern that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan is becoming increasingly less likely. The perception of a toughened Soviet position on Afghanistan has been accompanied by Indian gestures pointing in conflicting directions, indicating uncertainty. On the one hand, Gandhi has tried to rationalize the Soviet position by saying that

the outcry and feeling that everybody was ganging up against them have caused them [the Soviets] to dig in their toes.

On the other hand, she is displeased with the implications of the Soviet action. According to Indian officials; she responded negatively to Soviet invitations to visit Moscow on the occasion of the tenth anniversary

of the Soviet-Indian Friendship Treaty. Indian leaders still believe that "quiet diplomacy" may encourage Moscow to leave Afghanistan. To official India, the preferred solution of the Afghan crisis apparently includes the consolidation of the Karmal regime, the phased withdrawal of Soviet troops and the suspension of United States military sales, especially F-16's, to Pakistan.

However, the Soviet invasion has been condemned strongly by non-Communist Indian opposition groups, and many articles very critical of the Soviet action and the official Indian response have appeared in the Indian press. In marked contrast to his 1973 trip when thousands of people lined the route, during his 1980 visit Brezhnev was driven to Delhi in a bullet-proof car and faced many demonstrators. Popular sentiment in northwest India is especially sympathetic to the Afghan resistance.

Many Indians have argued that the Soviet invasion marks the beginning of a strategic conflict of interest between Delhi and Moscow. Many also believe that successful Soviet consolidation in Afghanistan will make the Soviet Union the dominant South Asian power. Others fear that Soviet power and influence may spread to Pakistan, threatening India directly. Indian opposition leaders argue that the Soviet invasion provided an opportunity for improved relations between India and Pakistan; they have been critical of their own government's policies. A number of analysts have suggested that if India distances itself from the Soviet Union, other states in the area, including Pakistan and the Gulf states, may move away from the great powers and work with Delhi on regional security issues.⁵

THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH ASIA

In contrast to the Soviet Union, South Asia has seldom had high priority for the United States. Nonetheless, United States attention to the region has increased at times of crisis in the area, be it regional conflict or a heightened perception of the Soviet threat. Since the revolution in Iran and especially since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, South Asia, especially Pakistan and the Arabian Sea, along with the Persian Gulf, have emerged from the periphery to the forefront of United States policy considerations.

Despite the common American and Indian commitment to a democratic political system, the two have often disagreed on major international issues, especially with regard to United States policies toward the region. American leaders think that Indian leaders do not appreciate global realities and the systemic conflict between the superpowers, which affect a spectrum of issues including developments in South Asia. Indian leaders believe that American diplomats do not un-

derstand regional complexities in South Asia and are insensitive to India's desires for regional dominance. These different priorities explain the Indian opposition to American efforts to seek allies in the area; and the conflict between Washington's efforts to increase the American naval presence in the region (to offset the enormous advantage the Soviet Union has in the region because of its proximity) and the Indian opposition to any outside naval presence in the area. India and the United States have also disagreed on issues of world order and North-South relations. India has opposed United States nonproliferation policies and has been an advocate of the New International Economic Order.

While India has opposed United States efforts in the area, Pakistan has been their main beneficiary, even though, like India, until recently Pakistan's concern has been almost exclusively regional. In the 1950's, United States policies toward the region were focused on containing what was seen as the joint Soviet-Chinese threat. Pakistan joined United States efforts at containment, becoming a member of two Western security pacts, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), and signing a mutual security agreement with the United States. By the early 1960's, Pakistan had become the United States' "most allied ally" in Asia. Pakistan's membership was in large part due to its desire to gain Western support to check India's regional ambitions.

But United States-Pakistani relations have run into problems of their own. In the aftermath of the Sino-Indian war of 1962, when the United States provided arms to India to contain the People's Republic of China, United States credibility with Pakistan declined. Relations between the two further deteriorated in 1965, when the United States (already preoccupied with the Vietnam conflict) imposed an embargo on arms to both India and Pakistan. United States attention to the area increased dramatically in 1971, before the Indo-Pakistani war. The United States opposed Indian war efforts and sent naval forces to the Bay of Bengal.

The American "tilt" toward Pakistan, which was serving as a middleman between the United States and China, infuriated India. Nor were Pakistanis reassured when they lost the war. Pakistan was also increasingly suspicious of the United States because it feared that Washington was accepting Indian hegemony in the

(Continued on page 228)

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⁵Bhabani Sen Gupta, "The Asian Tinder Box," *India Today*, May 16-18, 1981.

"India is trying to steer a middle course between the superpowers (reducing its dependence on the Soviet Union and improving its relations with the United States), to forge a link with the middle powers of West Europe, and to enhance its position of leadership in the third world."

India Enters the 1980's

BY ROBERT L. HARDGRAVE JR.

Professor of Government, University of Texas at Austin

THE elections of January, 1980, returned Indira Gandhi to power after nearly three years in opposition. With 43 percent of the popular vote, the Congress-I (I for Indira) commanded a solid majority in the new Parliament.* Gandhi's stunning political comeback was confirmed in state assembly elections over the next six months, as the Congress-I extended its control to 15 of India's 22 states.

The Janata government, which displaced 30 years of Congress rule in 1977, had collapsed, broken by internal party dissension. In its place, Gandhi promised "a government that works." Yet two years after her triumphant return as Prime Minister, she confronts disarray in her own party, corruption and inefficiency in state governments and increasing levels of urban and rural violence. In the economic sphere, the "black," parallel economy of undeclared incomes flourishes, farmers agitate for higher prices and inflation continues to squeeze the salaried middle classes. Yet for all its problems, the strength and resilience of Indian democracy belie the prophets of doom, and the Indian economy outperforms its critics' dim expectations.

India is the dominant power of the subcontinent. Its population of 700 million is greater than the populations of Latin America and Africa combined. It ranks as the tenth industrial nation of the world; third in the number of scientists and engineers; and fourth in the size of its armed forces. The reality of India's power, both actual and potential, is an essential element in the strategic context of southwest Asia and of world politics.

In the two years since her return to office, Gandhi has come personally to dominate the political scene. Through periodic ministerial reshuffles, she denies

anyone else the opportunity to build an independent power base; at the same time, she holds out hope to those out of favor that their turn too may come.

A victim of her own insecurity, Gandhi has surrounded herself with mediocre and weak Cabinet ministers. Notable exceptions are Foreign Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao, former Finance and now Defense Minister R. Venkataraman, and Pranab Mukerjee (who has moved from Commerce to Finance), although they too lack independent political bases. But their competence has not brought them the influence on the Prime Minister that characterized earlier, brief occupants of the musical chairs around her. Even within the Prime Minister's Secretariat and among her personal advisers, it is difficult to identify individuals who command her confidence beyond the specialized areas of their technocratic expertise. In domestic and administrative policy, the Prime Minister's Principal Secretary, P.C. Alexander, and Cabinet Secretary, Krishnaswami Rao Saheb, occupy critical positions. L.K. Jha, a strong advocate (as is Pranab Mukerjee) for the liberalized industrial strategy, is Gandhi's principal economic adviser.¹ G. Parthasarathy, a frequent personal emissary for the Prime Minister, is a respected foreign policy adviser. But in foreign policy, Gandhi relies more on her own instinct and judgment than on the counsel of others.²

The power structure of India rests upon the shoulders of Indira Gandhi alone. Within her own party, she is a giant among political pygmies. The state chief ministers lack independent popular bases and govern only on her sufferance. No rivals stand in the wings of the Congress-I to challenge her national leadership. Gandhi has demonstrated courage and political skill, but her shrewdness has not always served a larger purpose. Too often it has led to a politics of manipulation rather than purpose: a quest for power for its own sake. Her belief in her own indispensability and that of the family of Jawaharlal Nehru—immortalized during the Emergency in the phrase "Indira is India, India is Indira"—has nurtured the hope of dynastic succession. Although she once focused on her younger son, Sanjay, she has now cast Rajiv Gandhi as the heir apparent.

*I am grateful to Bashirrudin Ahmed and Stanley Kochanek for their suggestions in the preparation of this paper.

¹See L.K. Jha, *Economic Strategy for the 80s* (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1980). Jha, with a background in the prestigious Indian Civil Service (ICS), served as India's Ambassador to the United States from 1970 to 1973, and is currently chairman of the Administrative Reforms Committee.

²See Shashi Tharoor, *Reasons of State: Political Development and India's Foreign Policy under Indira Gandhi 1966-1977* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1982).

During the Emergency, Gandhi relied heavily on an inner circle of advisers ("the household") among whom Sanjay was the principal influence. During the months of political exile following Gandhi's 1977 defeat and during the 1980 election campaign, Sanjay moved to extend his power over the Congress-I organization. From his base as leader of the Youth Congress and with recruits owing him personal loyalty, Sanjay (elected to Parliament from the Amethi constituency in 1980) secured his influence in the Congress-I victories in the state assembly elections. As chief electoral strategist, he packed the state assemblies with his own people and installed chief ministers whose power rested solely on the favor of his mother and himself. But soon after assuming the post of Congress-I party general secretary, Sanjay was killed in an airplane crash on June 23, 1980.

Deeply shaken by her son's death, Indira Gandhi apparently lost interest in the affairs of both party and state. After some six months of drift, however, she gradually regained her bearings, this time with her elder son, Rajiv, at her side. In the spring of 1981, Rajiv, an Indian Airlines pilot with no political experience, agreed to enter Congress-I politics. In June, 1981, he won the Amethi by-election, the seat having been held vacant since Sanjay's death. Six months later, lauded by sycophants as the hope of India, Rajiv accepted the leadership of the Youth Congress-I. In contrast to his brash and determined younger brother, Rajiv—dubbed "Mr. Clean" by the press—has a subdued style. He seeks to introduce a managerial approach to party affairs, and those around him operate as youthful, low-key professionals. But Rajiv has yet to demonstrate the qualities of leadership that will be necessary for his political survival once his mother passes from the scene.

PARTIES IN DISARRAY

The personalism of Gandhi's rule has undermined Congress party organization.³ Indeed, since the first split in 1969, the party has lacked a coherent structure, and organizational elections have not been held since 1972. The Working Committee—once the crucial decision-making body of the party—met in December, 1981, for the first time in 13 months. At the state and local levels, the Congress-I is in disarray, with rampant factionalism and virtually no grass-roots organization. The party has come to function as an electoral machine, mobilized for campaigns and lubricated by enormous contributions but without a sustained life of

³For an analysis of the "de-institutionalization" of the Congress, see James Manor, "Party Decay and Political Crisis in India," *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 4 (summer, 1981), pp. 25-40.

⁴According to *India Today's* quarterly poll, two-thirds of those surveyed feel that things are going badly for the country, yet nearly 60 percent register satisfaction with Gandhi as Prime Minister. See *India Today*, January 15, 1982, p. 15.

its own. It is a structure perilously dependent on one person.

Forthcoming assembly elections in several states have stirred efforts for unity among the fragmented parties of the non-Communist opposition. But popular discontent, widespread though it may be, is not focused as it was in 1977 on Gandhi.⁴ Moreover, given the poor performance of the Janata government, the opposition parties lack credibility, and their unity moves meet considerable skepticism. The Lok Dal has a chance in Haryana, and the Bharatiya Janata party (BJP) is broadening its base in several states. But looking toward the 1985 general elections, the prospects for the opposition remain dim. Performance, however, is the key to Gandhi's political future, and she must rely on a bureaucracy weakened by political penetration and low morale and by state governments where, in some cases, ministerial incompetence and venality have gutted effective administration.

BUREAUCRACY AND ADMINISTRATION

Indian bureaucracy, once the "steel frame" of the Raj, has been weakened by political interference, arbitrary transfers and promotions and low pay. The elite services continue to attract men and women of impressive ability, and at the highest levels India is well served. But top salaries have been frozen for 30 years, and senior officers in the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) earn a fraction of the salaries of their counterparts in the private sector. The result has been an unprecedented hemorrhaging of the IAS; many of India's most competent government servants take early retirement or simply resign to make a lateral shift to high-level management positions in business and industry.

Gandhi has moved to protect the central bureaucracy from further corrosion, with some evidence of success, but in the states, administrative coherence is in serious decline. All generalizations about India are subject to qualification in terms of regional variation, and this is especially evident in judging the character of state governments. Within the Indian federal system, the states today range from the reasonably well administered (Gujarat and West Bengal) to those that are in virtual collapse (Uttar Pradesh and, at the bottom of everyone's list, Bihar). Most states are served by senior officers of capability and integrity, but every state administration is under pressure. In Madhya Pradesh and perhaps less dramatically in other states, legislators as well as ministers have been able to transfer civil servants in order to bring in political cronies, to oblige relatives, or to extort favors. The result has been a decline in bureaucratic morale and efficiency.

Corruption in state ministries is widespread and cynically accepted as a fact of political life. But in Maharashtra, Congress-I chief minister A.R. Antulay engaged in corruption on such a scale and so brazenly

that, as a direct result of a court decision against him, he resigned under pressure from the party's high command. Perhaps his ultimate sin, however, lay in his success in building a personal power base among the members of the state legislative assembly and in the arrogance of his belief that he was beyond Gandhi's control.

In Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, inefficiency and corruption are compounded by a triangular link among politicians, administrative and police officials, and criminal elements. A rise in the level of violence has accompanied the breakdown of administration in the two states.

SOCIAL UNREST AND VIOLENCE

Press coverage of specific incidents of violence tends to project a national image of widespread unrest that is not true. Most of India's countryside and cities have a relatively low level of unrest and violence. Indeed, it may be legitimately asked whether violence has increased or whether there is simply more public awareness of its scope and intensity. But while levels of violence may be exaggerated, no region is wholly immune, and in some areas violence is a problem of serious consequence.

As traditional relationships break down in the process of economic, social and political change, new opportunities open and aspirations rise. In the loosened social fabric, conflict intensifies as groups struggle to advance or to protect what they already have.

In Gujarat, for example, there was major rioting in 1980 over the issue of reservations for the Harijans (untouchables).⁵ On many university campuses in North India, gangs of armed students, with little hope of employment, war among themselves. Political murders by rival parties and factions have a long history in India, especially in West Bengal, and they have been on the increase in Kerala and the Punjab. But the number of such incidents in a nation the size of India pales in comparison to the bloodletting that characterizes so much of the third world.

Far more serious is the fact that law and order have given way to violence and gang rule in much of the Hindi heartland—Bihar, major portions of Uttar Pradesh (India's most populous state), and parts of Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. In this region of North India, country-made guns and automatic weapons are widespread, and the level of violence—official and non-official—marks a drift toward anarchy. Three patterns of violence—analytically distinguishable, but often mixed in practice—are most dramatically evident.⁶

⁵Reservations are affirmative action quotas in university admissions and public services. For an examination of the problem see the special issue of *Seminar*, "Reservations," no. 268 (December, 1981).

⁶I am grateful to Marcus Franda for suggesting this tripartite distinction.

The first, primarily in smaller towns and industrial areas, involves rival gangs of armed young toughs (*goondas*), typically with some education and a strong dose of Hindi film romance. Often in connivance with police officials, they engage in various criminal activities and hold local areas under mafia-like control. They are used by political parties to raise funds, to intimidate opponents, and for protection against similar tactics by other groups.

The second pattern of violence in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh involves attacks by backward caste gangs on Harijans. The conflict pits middle agricultural castes (Jats, Ahirs, Yadavs), who have just begun to advance economically, against assertive Harijans who are pushing up from the bottom. Such attacks number in the thousands each year, although they are perhaps fewer today than they were during the Janata years (1977-1979), when the backward castes regarded the rise of Charan Singh, their political mentor, as their chance to put the Harijans down once and for all.

The third pattern, which introduces a new element into what has become caste war, involves the use of violent *dacoits* (bandits) against political rivals or assertive Harijans. The November, 1981, massacre of 24 Harijans in Deoli, a village in Uttar Pradesh, dramatized the situation. For centuries, dacoity has been endemic in districts in southern Uttar Pradesh. Today, the gangs are extending their influence in Uttar Pradesh and have close ties with local police (who have themselves been politicized along caste lines) and with politicians of all parties. According to many reports, the dacoit attacks on Harijans are supported by elements within the Rajput (Thakur) caste, a landed, feudal class. As former zamindars, the Thakurs were the major victims of land reform in the 1950's. They were alienated from Congress, but in 1980 Sanjay recruited them as the linchpins of his Uttar Pradesh strategy, countering backward class support for Charan Singh's Lok Dal.

The link between Thakurs and the Harijan atrocities complicates Gandhi's political position in the state, for the Harijans are an essential element in her base of support. Opposition leaders lost no time in seeking to discredit Uttar Pradesh's Congress-I ministry for failure to protect Harijans, and politicians of both the government and the opposition accused each other of complicity in the killings.

In a vow to rid Uttar Pradesh of its dacoit menace within a month, chief minister V.P. Singh (a Thakur himself) unleashed official violence in a series of police "encounters" that left 310 alleged dacoits dead in the last six weeks of 1981. The body count for the year totaled 1,480. In the view of the opposition, the police have run amuck, settling old scores and killing innocent people in contrived encounters.

In contrast to caste violence, there has been a sharp decline in communal clashes between Hindus and

Muslims. There have been no serious disturbances since the August-September, 1980, riots in Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh. State and local officials have been alert to protect Muslims—a far easier task, given their urban concentration, than providing adequate protection for rural India's Harijans.

The Northeast remains ethnically unstable. There are outbreaks of tribal unrest in Mizoram and Manipur, and the Assam agitation for the expulsion of Bengali "foreigners" continues—a seemingly intractable problem that has stalemated negotiations. In the Punjab, always turbulent Sikh politics has gained an added dimension with the demand for an independent "Khalistan." While the demand (the inspiration of a handful of disaffected Canadian Sikhs with little support in the Punjab) is not a real issue, it is symbolic of Punjabi grievances.

Fissiparous tendencies have been the bane of Indian society, but in India's 34th year of independence, the nation's identity is fundamentally secure. In recognition of India's cultural and linguistic diversity, leaders hope that the language issue has been finally laid to rest: Hindi is becoming the national language by usage and acceptance, not by government fiat. While regionalism asserts itself in ethnic "sons of the soil" movements and in demands for greater state autonomy, no separatist movements of significance threaten the nation's integrity. Among the strongest bonds holding India together is the increasingly integrated economy.

THE ECONOMY ON THE UPSWING

The current economic situation in India is upbeat, in sharp contrast to much of the world. *India Today*, the nation's leading news magazine, writes of "a climate of euphoria in business circles," and *The Wall Street Journal* describes the Indian economy as "solid, even buoyant." After a decline in gross national income in 1979-1980, both agriculture and industry have registered substantial growth over the past two years. In 1981, industrial output is estimated to have risen by eight percent and agricultural production by four percent.

This has been accompanied by a decline in the rate of inflation from 22 percent in 1979 to 15 percent in 1980 and to about 10 percent in 1981, and 1982 should see the rate still lower. There is some fear that government efforts to curb inflation may bring on a recession, but such forecasts have not slowed investment or dampened the enthusiasm of the private sector. Without denigrating India's real achievement, however, it is important to recognize that the growth rates represent increases from points of decline, and the net increase for both industry and agriculture is considerably less. Moreover, population growth continues to overwhelm India's progress. According to the 1981 census, the population grew at a rate of 2.4 percent per year over the past decade (the same as the

rate of growth in food grains production), yielding a net economic growth for the decade of 2.2 percent.

Sustained industrial growth depends on relieving shortages (cement and steel) and infrastructural constraints (power and transport), and here the public sector continues to drag. Power, coal and railroads have begun to show some improvement and have been targeted by the government for concentrated effort. Power generation has increased, but shortages continue to place a serious burden on industrial growth, especially in West Bengal. Railroads remain a bottleneck, and the replacement and addition of rolling stock will not be sufficient to meet transportation requirements.

Industry is further burdened by labor unrest, although there has been some improvement in the situation over the past two years. In what the opposition views as an authoritarian step harkening back to the Emergency, in 1981 the government assumed the power to ban strikes in "essential services" and to arrest troublemakers suspected of threatening the public order. The government justified the legislation—first promulgated as a series of ordinances—as necessary to raise industrial production, to restore labor discipline, and to hold down prices against demands by unions for higher wages.

The favorable business climate in India today is in large part due to liberalization in licensing and controls. While maintaining a left-of-center political image, Gandhi has taken the economy to the right. The new industrial policy is pragmatic, designed to "deliver the goods." The rhetoric of socialism is noticeably absent from the Prime Minister's speeches, and the word does not even appear in her 1980 election manifesto.

Economic policy, however, is riddled with contradictions. India seeks to attract foreign investment, but delays and regulations, together with a schizophrenic attitude toward foreign capital, have often sent the multinational corporations elsewhere. India is determined to change this situation, and there is some evidence of new foreign interest in investment opportunities. Economic incentives promote exports, but Indian goods have not always found a ready or open market. Exports, a critical element in the new strategy, are also impeded by industries with obsolete plants and equipment, which increase product cost and weaken India's competitive position abroad. But perhaps the overriding problem Gandhi faces in relaxing the restraints of the "permit Raj" is that for every regulation, there is a vested interest that seeks its perpetuation.

In the agricultural sector, food grain production is up after three lean years. But many economists believe that food output may have reached a plateau and that it is unlikely to increase substantially at current levels of technology. Moreover, Indian self-sufficiency in grains is threatened by diseases in both wheat and rice in the Punjab. The situation is further complicated by

an enormous jump in the costs of inputs, notably fertilizers. With unrelenting population growth, the per capita availability of food grains is likely to decline. Stocks are already low, and there is considerable hoarding in anticipation of price increases. In 1981, despite protest from farmers, India imported wheat for the first time in six years in order to hold down grain prices.

Over the past two years, broadly based farmer movements have formed in more than half a dozen states. In agitation that has pitted the countryside against the city, farmers are demanding higher prices and more agricultural inputs at lower cost. The farmer movements are a major threat to Gandhi and opposition parties are scrambling to identify themselves with the farmers' cause.

The farmers are not the only group in an economic squeeze, but the conflict of urban-rural interests undermines a common front. The salaried middle class, like the industrial labor force, is under increasing pressure. Unemployment is officially tallied at 16 million, but unofficial estimates place the figure more realistically at 30 million—12 percent of the total work force. The expanding ranks of the educated unemployed add an explosive element to a potentially volatile mix. Inequity in the distribution of income and limited access to the benefits of the current industrial boom are exacerbated by the black economy. Estimates of black money in circulation range from 20 to 50 percent of Indian gross national product, and the percentage continues to grow.

India suffers serious balance of payments problems, largely because of increases in crude oil prices. Petroleum accounts for nearly half India's total imports, and it takes roughly 80 percent of its export earnings to pay for the petroleum. Yet the nation's foreign exchange reserves remain relatively comfortable, and India enjoys an excellent international credit rating. The 1981 International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan—\$5.8 billion, the largest ever granted—will provide a massive injection into the Indian economy. But by the mid-1980's, debt service and repatriation on the IMF loan as well as loans from the World Bank and other lending sources will be staggering.

THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

India's economic face to the West is accompanied by its continued friendship with the Soviet Union and a geopolitical perspective that, more often than not, is at odds with United States interests in the subcontinent. Gandhi pursues a "pragmatic" foreign policy in quest of independence and recognition of India's po-

sition as the dominant power of the subcontinent. India is trying to steer a middle course between the superpowers (reducing its dependence on the Soviet Union and improving relations with the United States), to forge a link with the middle powers of West Europe, and to enhance its position of leadership in the third world. In practice, however, India's foreign policy has often been burdened by a rhetoric that serves neither policy nor national interest.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on the eve of Gandhi's return to power changed the strategic environment of South Asia.⁷ Even before taking the oath of office as Prime Minister, Gandhi took command of India's foreign policy. Under instructions from New Delhi, India's envoy to the United Nations delivered a speech (now, by most accounts, deeply regretted) in which Soviet justification for the intervention was taken at face value. India abstained on the resolution calling for "the immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan."* In India's view, isolating the Soviet Union by condemning it would only strengthen Soviet resolve and make a political solution to the crisis more difficult. But India also envisioned for itself a constructive role in facilitating the solution that would enable the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops, confident that its security interests in the region were protected.

Soviet intransigence soon frustrated India's efforts to "defuse" the crisis. In meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and later with President Leonid Brezhnev, Gandhi made it clear that India wanted Soviet troops to withdraw from Afghanistan as soon as possible. In its public stand, India pulled back from the earlier United Nations speech to assume a more critical position, but one that concomitantly decried United States efforts to use the Afghan crisis as an excuse for rearming Pakistan and building a strategic consensus in Southwest Asia.

SOUTHWEST ASIA

India's fundamental concern is to keep both the Soviet Union and the United States out of South Asia. India maintains that the Soviet action in Afghanistan is not the source but the consequence of deepening superpower rivalry in the region. Its reaction to the Afghan crisis has been shaped by a regional perspective and by the fear that South Asia will become an arena of great power confrontation and internal conflict. In this context, India views United States military

(Continued on page 225)

*For the text of this resolution, see page 232 of this issue.
⁷For an Indian perspective on the invasion, see Bhabani Sen Gupta, *The Afghan Syndrome: How to Live with Soviet Power* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1982). Also, K.P. Misra, ed., *Afghanistan in Crisis* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1981).

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"The United States has found a way to strengthen both Pakistan's capacity and its resolve to resist Soviet pressures . . . and has made it possible for Pakistan to play a potentially wider security role in the region Pakistan has secured the means to upgrade and modernize its military without giving up its nonaligned status or being forced to make any serious commitment on the use of its new weapons."

Pakistan: A New "Front-Line" State?

BY WILLIAM L. RICHTER

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CONTEMPORARY Pakistan may appear to outside observers as a bundle of paradoxes. The martial law regime of General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq seized power on July 5, 1977, with the solemn promise to relinquish it within 90 days; it is about to complete its first half-decade in office. General Zia, who assumed the office of President in 1978, continues to reaffirm that all current arrangements are temporary and that neither he nor the army can remain in power very long.

Far from being a mere caretaker, however, the present regime has embarked on a series of steps directed toward the transformation of Pakistan's society, economy and polity into a new Islamic order. Although few people (including Zia himself) credit the country's military ruler with more than modest abilities as a politician or leader, Zia has managed not only to stay in power almost as long as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, his more charismatic predecessor, but also to preside over economic and diplomatic triumphs that have brought considerable recognition to himself and his regime. Most notable, perhaps, has been the re forging of Pakistan's ties with the United States, itself a somewhat paradoxical development considering the state of United States-Pakistani relations in the late 1970's.

To some extent, these apparent contradictions represent problems that have plagued Pakistan's political culture at least since the country's creation in 1947. For more than one-third of a century, neither civilian nor military regimes have succeeded in creating and sustaining an effective political order. Other features of contemporary Pakistan, particularly the impetus to-

ward Islamization, tap deep-seated cultural aspirations that have been frustrated in the past in various ways. They also reassert Islamic values and identity. Pakistan's politics and policies are also heavily conditioned by recent global and regional developments, most notably the events in neighboring Afghanistan and Iran.

From the beginning, the martial law regime has wavered between the goals of restoration and reform.¹ On the one hand, General Zia announced on the day of the takeover that the "sole objective" of the regime was the holding of fair elections and the return of government power to civilian hands. The 1973 constitution was not abrogated by the military; certain portions were "held in abeyance." Although the attempt to hold elections was twice aborted—in October, 1977, and November, 1979 (in both cases because the anticipated results were not acceptable to the military)—General Zia continues to search for some means of restoring civilian rule. Although he has rejected the establishment of a permanent military government or even the sort of "civilianized" system President Muhammad Ayub Khan created in the 1960's, Zia has not provided a blueprint showing where he wants to go or how he intends to get there.

On the other hand, there is a reformist Islamic element in the current regime. Within weeks of his coming to power, Zia decreed new criminal punishments, based on a literal reading of the Koran, including flogging and the cutting off of hands for specified offenses. Since then, additional steps moved Pakistan closer to a new Islamic order. On February 10, 1979, General Zia introduced new Islamic laws, including new punishments for adultery, theft and drinking, and new Islamic taxes (Zakat and Ushr).² Other Islamic reforms affected the court structure and the electoral system, educational policy and the economy. Interest-free (risk-sharing) deposit arrangements have been established in banks and other financial institutions, with apparently good success and a fair return to investors. During the army's five years in power, the goal of Islamization has gradually—but not totally—superseded the restoration of parliamentary and democratic representative institutions.

¹See William L. Richter, "Persistent Praetorianism: Pakistan's Third Military Regime," *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 51, no. 3 (fall, 1978), pp. 404-26.

²Zakat is a welfare tax, amounting to two and one-half percent of visible assets, with the proceeds distributed to the needy through Zakat committees. Ushr is an agricultural tax of five percent of total production. For greater detail, see *Introduction of Islamic Laws: Address to the Nation by President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq* (Islamabad: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1979); and William L. Richter, "Pakistan," in Mohammed Ayoob, ed., *The Politics of Islamic Reassertion* (London: Croom Helm, 1981), pp. 141-62.

Unable to return to civilian government by means of free elections, General Zia has searched for other alternatives. He has hinted at the possibility of holding national referenda and building a national government on the basis of the local officials elected in August, 1979, somewhat on the order of President Ayub Khan's Basic Democracy system of 1962-1969. More frequently, Zia has contemplated an Islamic political system, with an emir and Majlis chosen on the basis of moral character rather than partisan competition. Although his public statements often reiterate his pledge to hold elections "when conditions permit," on several occasions he has observed the inapplicability and inappropriateness of "Western-style" elections in Pakistan.

On March 23, 1981, General Zia issued a new Provisional Constitution Order which, among other things, provided for the appointment of a 350-member Majlis-i-Shura (Federal Council). By the end of the year, the martial law regime had appointed approximately four-fifths of the projected membership, apparently retaining the rest of the appointments for future patronage. The Majlis held its initial session in Islamabad early in January, 1982.

The Majlis has apparently at least three intended functions. It provides a "link" between the government and the people; by giving its approval to government policies, it makes them somehow appear less unrepresentative; and it is supposed to "decide the question of the country's future pattern of government."³ But the reactions of the press and party politicians to the new Majlis were generally skeptical.

Although Zia's statements on the characteristics of a truly Islamic polity suggested that government officials would be chosen on the basis of their righteousness and their adherence to Islamic principles, the actual composition of the Majlis revealed that the criteria of selection were more pragmatic than ideological. Those who had proved their loyalty to the regime in local or provincial councils during the past two years were well represented as were members of the major landed families, who have always supported whichever rulers happened to be in power.

It remains to be seen whether the new Majlis will be more than a rubber stamp for the actions of the government. During its January session, some members questioned government policies, only to be told rather sharply by Finance Minister Ghulam Ishaq Khan that they had not been appointed to criticize the government.⁴ Despite the new line, power remains in the hands of the military: General Zia, his service chiefs, his corps commanders, and the four military officers who serve as provincial governors. Policy direction and

initiative continue to remain with a few key civilian officials, like Finance Minister Ishaq and Foreign Minister Agha Shahi.

The new Majlis will provide a facade of popular participation, and it may in fact suggest some ways out of the political impasse that has plagued Pakistan for the last four years. However, it would be overly optimistic to expect a significant shift in power from military to civilian hands or a restoration of representative government through elections. Zia is likely to find, as he has before, that what is acceptable to himself and his military colleagues may not be acceptable to the voting public and vice versa.

OPPOSITION AND REPRESSION

When the army took power in 1977, politics was polarized between Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's party (PPP) and the nine-party opposition coalition Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). Subsequent maneuvering and factionalism transformed that cleavage. Several parties have been split over the issue of whether to collaborate with the military authorities, while repeated government postponement of elections led to dialogue and cooperation among political groups that had bitterly opposed one another.

Technically, political parties have been outlawed since October, 1979, when elections were last canceled. However, party leaders continue to operate within a restricted range, to issue press releases and even to confer with Zia and other government authorities as representatives of their party positions. The press reports their activities by referring to them as the "defunct" Pakistan Muslim League, or even as "the PPP (defunct)."

In the early months of 1981, it appeared that the party leaders might succeed in a concerted effort to force the government to deliver on its long overdue pledge to hold elections and relinquish power. Representatives of nine parties met in Lahore and formed a Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), calling for an end to martial law and the holding of elections. During the same period, the judiciary also displayed a greater willingness to question the actions of the military authorities. The Baluchistan High Court, especially, agreed to hear cases questioning the legitimacy of the martial law authority.⁵

This apparent coalescing of opposition to military rule was shattered, however, by two developments in March, 1981. The first was the dramatic hijacking of a Pakistan International Airways Boeing airliner, including the murder of one of its passengers and prolonged negotiations over the release of prisoners in Pakistani jails in return for the remaining hostages. It soon became obvious that the hijacking had been perpetrated by al-Zulfikar, a terrorist organization led by Murtaza Bhutto, son of the late Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Although Bhutto's widow Begum Nus-

³*Overseas Weekly Dawn*, November 13, 1982, p. 1.

⁴*Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 5, 1982, p. 11.

⁵Lawrence Lifschultz, "A Fundamental Debate," *op. cit.*, March 13, 1981, pp. 21-22.

rat Bhutto and her daughter Benazir, who inherited the leadership of the PPP when the elder Bhutto was executed in 1979, disclaimed any foreknowledge of or involvement with the hijacking, the event splintered the MRD, threw the opposition into disarray, and provided the military with justification for widespread arrests. The Pakistan Muslim League (PML), led by the Pir of Pagaro, and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP), both former components of the PNA, seized on the issue as an excuse to pull out of the MRD and to declare their support for the military authorities in the face of such wanton violence.

The second major action that aborted criticism of the regime was the issuing of the Provisional Constitution Order (PCO) on March 23, 1981. The order expressly prohibited judicial questioning of martial law authority or actions and required judges to take an oath of loyalty to the PCO rather than to the 1973 constitution. At least 19 senior judges refused to sign the new oath and were summarily dismissed. The PCO thus successfully thwarted criticism of the regime, but it also removed the last orderly channel of dissent within the system and any check on the abuse of authority.

As government control tightened in Pakistan, both official repression and anti-regime violence intensified. An Amnesty International report issued in January, 1982, "noted a steady deterioration in respect for human rights in Pakistan, particularly since the beginning of 1981."⁶ The report provided detailed accounts of arbitrary arrest and detention, the arrest of critics of the government and their relatives without warrant, the holding of prisoners incommunicado, the flogging of prisoners for nonviolent political activities, the subjection of civilians to summary military trials, torture, the death of prisoners while in police custody, and a sharp increase in the number of executions.⁷ The allegations made in the Amnesty International report were vigorously denied by Pakistani officials. Although the report itself was not made available to the public in Pakistan, the press openly reported official denials of its validity.

The PIA hijacking was one of a series of events over the last several months that indicate that the level of

⁶*Pakistan: Human Rights Violations and the Decline of the Rule of Law* (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1982), p. 1.

⁷Similar evidence was presented to U.S. congressional subcommittee hearings by Amnesty International and other monitoring agencies in September, 1981. See "The Current Human Rights Situation in Pakistan," statement submitted for the record by Amnesty International USA in hearings before the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs, Asian and Pacific Affairs, and International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, September, 1981; "Atrocities of Military Rule in Pakistan," prepared by Pakistan Committee for Democracy and Justice, New York, September, 1981.

⁸*Overseas Weekly Dawn*, November 6, 1981, p. 1.

violent protest is on the increase in Pakistan. Shortly before the hijacking, another PIA airliner was mysteriously destroyed by fire at the Karachi airport. There are frequent reports of bombings, including one when Pope John Paul II visited in Karachi in 1981. In November, 1981, in an armed attack in Lahore, veteran PML politician Chaudhri Zahur Ilahi and his driver were killed, and former Supreme Court Justice Maulvi Mushtaq was injured. Despite extensive press censorship, there are sporadic reports of campus killings, attacks on police outposts and other outbursts of violence. Law and order were major topics of conversation at the January, 1982, meeting of the new Majlis. Although officials charged that many incidents were connected with an "international conspiracy" to destabilize Pakistan, with thinly veiled references to al-Zul-fikar, it was difficult to deny that festering public discontent with prolonged military dictatorship was increasingly finding violent outlets.

ECONOMIC GROWTH AMID POLITICAL STAGNATION

One reason—perhaps the major reason—why political discontent in Pakistan has not yet erupted in mass protest, as it did in the late 1960's and again in early 1977, has been the relative strength of the economy. Under the leadership and direction of Finance Minister Ghulam Ishaq Khan (and as a result of a series of good crop years), the Pakistani economy has shown significant improvement in agricultural and industrial productivity, exports, savings and investments since the military takeover in 1977. Although during the past year growth has appeared to slow somewhat from its pace during the two previous years, it still remains significantly ahead of the increase in population. The State Bank of Pakistan Report for 1980-1981 revealed a growth rate of 5.7 percent in gross domestic product (compared with 7 percent the previous year), a 6-percent growth in commodity production (versus 7.8 percent in 1979-1980), a 9.2-percent increase in manufacturing (versus 9.5 percent the previous year), and an increase in gross fixed investment of 11.6 percent (compared with 25 percent the previous year).⁸ At the same time, however, the economy continued to be plagued by trade deficits and by inflation, both the result in part of levels and costs of imports, including petroleum imports.

Some of Pakistan's economic growth under the present regime can be attributed to improved economic management. Threats of nationalization, rife under Bhutto, have been eliminated, and incentives have been directed toward greater productivity. However, fortuitous external factors also reinforced the recovery. The first of these is the large-scale migration of Pakistani labor abroad, particularly to the Middle East. Remittances from Pakistani workers outside the country totaled approximately \$2.225 billion in 1980-1981, Pakistan's largest single source of foreign exchange.

Although foreign remittances have had inflationary effects on certain sectors of the economy, particularly land and housing prices and wages, the "escape valve" of migration has reduced pressures on domestic employment and removed a potentially disruptive political element from the scene.

The second major source of external support for Pakistan's economy has been the global economic community, i.e., international lending agencies like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and the United States, Japan, and the industrialized countries of West Europe. Although initially reluctant to invest in Pakistan under what appeared to be a temporary and potentially unstable military regime, during the past two years policymakers in these countries and agencies have firmly endorsed the Zia regime. In December, 1980, the IMF approved a record-setting loan to Pakistan of nearly \$1.7 billion.⁹ The World Bank's Aid Pakistan Consortium met the following June and pledged \$1.17 billion to Pakistan, including relief for Afghan refugees in Pakistan, again a record-setting amount. Pakistan's major creditors have agreed to debt rescheduling, and meetings with Japanese, European Economic Community (EEC), and United States officials within the past several months have all signaled an improved environment for trade and investment. Pakistan has also continued to receive significant economic aid from Saudi Arabia and other fellow Islamic states in the Gulf region.

Government economic policies have been encouraging to both domestic and foreign private investment. While inaugurating a new cement plant on January 1, 1982, Zia reiterated his position that "the private sector was the cornerstone of his government's industrial policy."¹⁰ Foreign companies have been invited to collaborate in petroleum exploration and other ventures, and Zia, Ishaq, and other Pakistani officials have met with American and European businessmen to encourage foreign investment in Pakistan. Under IMF pressure, import restrictions have been eased, and foreign advisers have urged greater deregulation of the economy to encourage further growth.

Despite the recent slowing of its growth rates, the Pakistani economy apparently has considerable capacity for further expansion, particularly if foreign remittances and external support continue to be strong. On the other hand, inflation and energy dependence are major problems. Growth may lead to further problems of distribution, particularly under conditions where union activity is suppressed. The pressures of more than two million Afghan refugees in the two

western provinces presents potential economic as well as political problems. Perhaps the most vulnerable features of the economy, however, are its growing dependence on the remittances of Pakistani workers abroad and on international assistance. It is possible that both foreign aid and remittances will continue to provide the necessary conditions for growth and eventual self-sufficiency. If cutbacks should occur in either field, however, the economic and political consequences could be serious.

PAKISTAN AS A FRONT-LINE STATE

Pakistan's international role in the present decade has been greatly affected by two developments in the closing months of the 1970's. The culmination of the Islamic revolution in neighboring Iran, which drove out the Shah and brought anti-American forces to power, knocked the cornerstone out of the United States strategic edifice in Southwest Asia. And the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December, 1979, escalated and intensified the conflict in that beleaguered country, swelled the flow of refugees to Pakistan, brought Soviet troops literally to Pakistan's borders, and threatened in various ways to expand the conflict into Pakistan. With the loss of Afghanistan as a traditional buffer, policymakers and commentators in Pakistan and elsewhere have come to regard Pakistan as a "front-line" state in confrontation with the Soviet Union. In the restructuring of the United States strategic consensus in the Middle East after the "loss" of Iran, Pakistan (along with Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt) has come to play an increasingly prominent part.

United States-Pakistani relations, on the decline since the mid-1960's, reached their low point in 1979. When the United States cut off all non-food aid because of Pakistan's apparent nuclear weapons program, Pakistan joined Iran in pulling out of CENTO (the Central Treaty Organization) and joining the non-aligned movement; angry mobs burned the United States embassy in Islamabad and several other American buildings in Pakistan.¹¹ Immediately after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, United States President Jimmy Carter offered Pakistan a \$400-million package of military and economic aid, which General Zia subsequently rejected as "peanuts." The United States administration of Ronald Reagan resumed negotiations with Pakistan and reached agreement in mid-1981 on a package that apparently satisfied the security interests of both countries. The package includes \$3.2 billion in assistance, half in economic aid and half in military credits, spread over the next five years. In addition, the United States agreed to sell to Pakistan, on a cash basis, up to 40 advanced F-16 fighter aircraft, for a total of approximately \$1.1 billion. In seeking congressional approval of the agreement, Reagan administration spokesmen stressed the

⁹Although the loan set a new record at that time for loans to developing countries, it has since been surpassed by one of approximately \$5.8 billion to India.

¹⁰*Overseas Weekly Dawn*, January 8, 1982, p. 1.

¹¹Richter and W. Eric Gustafson, "Pakistan in 1979: Back to Square One," *Asian Survey*, vol. 20, no. 2 (February, 1980), pp. 188-96.

need to upgrade Pakistan's defensive capabilities and the symbolic importance of the F-16's as a measure of the United States commitment to Pakistan's security.

As expected, India objected strongly to the deal, particularly to the F-16's. Although India will continue to have decisive military superiority in the region even after the rearmament of Pakistan, the sophisticated electronic equipment and the strike capabilities of the new aircraft increase the possibility of greater damage to Indian targets in any future conflict.

United States critics of the package similarly stressed the danger that United States military aid may disrupt the power configuration in South Asia, leading to a new arms race on the subcontinent and increasing the possibility of another war between India and Pakistan.¹² Other arguments against the proposal included its anticipated reinforcement of the military dictatorship in Pakistan and the Zia regime's dismal human rights record.¹³ Pakistan's purported nuclear weapons development program was cited both in support of and in opposition to the proposed assistance package. Opponents stressed nonproliferation policies that preclude aid to countries developing nuclear weapons except under special circumstances. Proponents argued that the five-year assistance program would provide the United States with greater leverage to deter, or at least defer, Pakistan's testing or completion of a nuclear device. Neither side seemed to take seriously General Zia's repeated denials that Pakistan is developing a nuclear weapons capability.

Three other potential problems were considered by the United States Congress before it approved the administration's package. The potentially most explosive of these is the question of Baluchistan, Pakistan's southwestern province, in which persistent separatist sentiments erupted into an undeclared civil war dur-

ing 1973-1977.¹⁴ Although recognizing that prolonged military rule in Islamabad may intensify Baluch alienation, proponents of support to Pakistan argued that some economic assistance in the package would be targeted to alleviate the conditions of deprivation in Baluchistan.

The other issues centered on the burgeoning Afghan refugee population and the problem of narcotics production, both of which primarily concern Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). In both instances, investigators concluded that Pakistan was taking as many positive steps as possible.¹⁵

A REMARKABLE ACHIEVEMENT

In many respects, the United States-Pakistani relationship is a remarkable diplomatic achievement for both countries. The United States has found a way to strengthen both Pakistan's capacity and its resolve to resist Soviet pressures from beyond the Khyber Pass and has made it possible for Pakistan to play a potentially wider security role in the region.¹⁶ Pakistan has secured the means to upgrade and modernize its military without giving up its nonaligned status or being forced to make any serious commitments on the use of its new weapons. As in many such international agreements, however, the potential for misunderstanding and differing interpretations remains great. The United States sees the Soviet force in Afghanistan as the major threat to Pakistan. Pakistan sees India as the threat. The United States expects leverage; Pakistan expects "complete independence of action." The United States expects Pakistan to remain firm on the principle of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and nonrecognition of the Babrak Karmal regime; Pakistan, in basic agreement, appears more flexible concerning negotiation with the Soviet Union.

Pakistan has attempted diplomatically to minimize the adverse impact of its arms buildup on its relations with both India and the Soviet Union. In mid-1981, during final negotiations on the arms deal with the United States, Pakistan offered India a mutual no-war pact. India, originally scornful of the proposal because of its timing, has subsequently given it more serious consideration. Exchange visits by the foreign ministers and India's counterproposal of a friendship treaty have helped to keep alive the hope that Pakistan's new arms might have the ironic effect of encouraging dialogue rather than enmity with its larger neighbor. In

(Continued on page 225)

¹²Selig Harrison, "Fanning Flames in South Asia," *Foreign Policy*, no. 45 (winter, 1981-1982), pp. 84-102.

¹³Testimony by Stephen P. Cohen, Ainslie Embree, William L. Richter and Selig S. Harrison before the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs, Asian and Pacific Affairs, and International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, September, 1981.

¹⁴Harrison, "Nightmare in Baluchistan," *Foreign Policy*, no. 32 (fall, 1978), pp. 136-60; and Harrison, *Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981), pp. 71-91.

¹⁵*Proposed U.S. Assistance and Arms Transfers to Pakistan: An Assessment*, report of a staff study mission to Pakistan and India, September 30-October 17, 1981. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, November 20, 1981 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981), pp. 30-32, 35-36.

¹⁶The F-16's, for instance, will have a range sufficient to cover the Persian Gulf. Harrison suggests that American strategists also contemplate the use of Pakistani bases for the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force, but this idea seems highly speculative at the moment.

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"If this country of more than 80 million people goes Communist, from the Western perspective it will adversely affect the South Asian balance of power. The United States and the Western allies would like to see Bangladesh continue as an independent nation without becoming an ideologically radical state."

Bangladesh Today

BY M. RASHIDUZZAMAN

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IN its first ten years, chaotic politics has raised questions for stability and progress in Bangladesh. In 1975, the four-year-old civilian administration was abruptly ended by the brutal overthrow and killing of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, an event followed by more than three years of martial law. An elected government was restored in 1979 after a parliamentary election won by the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist party (BNP). In May, 1981, the country's politics took another unfortunate turn with the abortive coup and assassination of President Ziaur Rahman (also known as Zia). After Zia's murder, there was an election in November, 1981, the third presidential election in four years. Although the election sustained the peaceful transition, political, diplomatic and economic constraints have haunted this impoverished nation.

The military elite that catapulted into power in 1975 promised to restore democracy and stability to Bangladesh step by step.¹ From 1975 to 1979, Ziaur Rahman followed a gradual process to restore a civilian government backed by a new constitution and an elected leadership. Thus in May, 1977, Ziaur Rahman, then a martial law administrator, held a referendum in which he obtained more than 98 percent of the vote, allowing him to assume full responsibility as President. His critics opposed the referendum and questioned the legitimacy of his administration. In order to establish his credentials as an elected leader, he ordered a presidential election in 1978; at that time, he routed the opposition by receiving nearly 77 percent of the popular vote. During this second phase of the Zia regime political activities were resumed. The 1979 parliamentary election accelerated the political process further.

In that election, the BNP won 207 seats, more than two-thirds of the seats in the 300-member Parliament, but it did so with only 41.16 percent of the vote, hardly

a unique record in a first-past-the-post system in which 29 recognized parties contested along with a flock of independents.² However, the election confirmed the fact that Zia's personal popularity and charisma had helped to institutionalize a new national political platform. The 1978 and 1979 elections also contributed toward building a civilian administration after the instability unleashed by the 1975 coup. In both elections, Zia presented himself as a pragmatic leader committed to the development and modernization of the country.

During this period, the country went through a realignment of political forces. The newly created BNP, which aimed at broadening popular support for the Zia regime, was not a unified organization but a conglomerate of divergent forces brought together by Zia. The Awami League and a variety of left-wing forces denounced the system as a one-man show. Zia was criticized for suppressing civil liberties and imprisoning many of his political foes. The execution of several military officers for their alleged involvement in the abortive coups was also severely criticized in Bangladesh and outside.

Another significant development was the reemergence of right-wing Islamic forces that were opposed to the secular bias of the Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Since 1972, religiously oriented parties had been banned in Bangladesh; it was believed that the Awami Leaguers had banned the Islamic parties at India's request. When these restrictions were withdrawn, the Islamic parties freely sought public office; when Bangladesh began to receive economic aid from oil-rich Arab countries, the Islamic parties sought greater political recognition.

Even with an articulate opposition, Ziaur Rahman was one of the successful contemporary leaders of the third world, providing Bangladesh with leadership and stability. For the first time in its 10-year existence, Bangladesh, once described by United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger as an international basket case, became nearly self-sufficient in food. Zia's target was to become self-sufficient in food by 1985.

After Zia's assassination, there were two constructive developments. First, the Bangladesh military, in spite of many rumors, did not declare martial law; it allowed

¹Azizul Haque, "Bangladesh 1979; Cry for a Sovereign Parliament," in Mohammad Mohabbat Khan and Habib Mohammad Zafarullah, *Politics and Bureaucracy in a New Nation: Bangladesh* (Dacca: Center for Administrative Studies, 1980).

²Craig Baxter and M. Rashiduzzaman, "Bangladesh Votes: 1978 and 1979," *Asian Survey*, April, 1981.

the political succession to follow a constitutional route. Second, the election of November, 1981, resulted in the massive victory of 75-year-old acting President Abdus Sattar, a moderate who was committed to the policies of his predecessor.

The political opposition to Sattar came from the well-organized Awami League, the party that spearheaded the liberation movement against the Pakistani army in 1971. The party's presidential candidate, Kamal Hossain, an Oxford educated lawyer-politician, pledged to scrap the political system created by Zia and to restore a British type of parliamentary democracy in Bangladesh. Although the Awami League was badly beaten in the election, its leadership barely acknowledged the defeat and alleged that the ruling BNP had resorted to widespread rigging and intimidation. Mujibur Rahman's daughter Hasina emerged as the leader of the Awami League party; she attracted considerable attention during the election campaign, largely capitalizing on her father's memory. Despite accusations of rigging, the election of November, 1981, was smooth and peaceful by the standards of most developing countries. The election was finally determined by the popularity of and sympathy for Ziaur Rahman, skillfully exploited by Sattar and his BNP.

Nonetheless, the Awami League had considerable support in urban areas and among the educated elite, while Sattar, promising to follow the socioeconomic programs of his predecessor, inspired confidence in the villages. Although the Awami League's contribution to national independence could hardly be denied, there was deep suspicion about the party's economic and foreign policies. Many feared that if the party were elected, the country might stumble into further economic chaos. Before the assassination of Mujibur Rahman in 1975, the country had suffered a famine (in 1974), and the constitution had been drastically changed to make Bangladesh a one-party system.³ The Awami League is also regarded as amenable to New Delhi, and in the context of fear and suspicion about India's goals in Bangladesh it hardly inspired the confidence of the voters.

Many feared that the Awami League might launch a well-orchestrated mass movement in the cities and bring down the government. Despite its electoral defeat, the League has a considerable following among students and the middle class. In Bangladeshi politics, the support of the student community is important. However, the latest reports from Bangladesh indicate that the League is divided by internal factionalism and personal rivalries.

Bangladesh also has many left-wing parties with var-

ious ideological affiliations, including some that are affiliated with Moscow. The Maoists are not so much interested in the electoral politics but rather hope to radicalize the countryside. In the last three elections, the performance of the radical parties has been poor.

During the last few years, violence among the tribal people in Chittagong Hill Tracts has also caused concern. The hill tribes represent an ethnic and religious minority in Bangladesh. Ethnically, they are closer to the Burmese and southern Chinese and are predominantly Buddhist in religion. They are apparently interested in a separate national identity and are engaging in secessionist activities. It should be added that the hill tribes in northeast India are also engaged in a secessionist struggle against New Delhi; as a result, Chittagong Hill Tracts has become a sensitive area in South Asia.

THE MILITARY

The country's 70,000-man army, which has been linked with much of the violence of the past years, continues to be an important political force. After Zia's assassination, the army did not obstruct the constitutional succession nor the electoral process. While taking a neutral stance, the army chief of staff, General Hossein Mohammad Ershad, was known to have supported Sattar and the ruling BNP. But after the November elections, he startled the country by persistent public demands that the army should participate in the administration in order to prevent further military coups. The newly elected President challenged the military chief by announcing that the army had no role other than protecting the sovereignty of the country.

In view of the widening rift between the military and civilian administration, there were important developments in early 1982. In January, the President appointed a National Security Council (NSC) to replace the old National Defense Council. The principal purpose of the council was to examine the national security requirements and the needs of the armed services and to explore ways in which the military could participate in the country's socioeconomic development.

Political confusion increased when, on February 11, President Sattar dismissed the entire Cabinet and reconstituted it, after sacking 22 ministers for alleged corruption and incompetence. It was reported that the military exerted pressure on the President to take this action.⁴ When the Bangladeshi Parliament began its winter session later in February the alleged political "super authority" exercised by the military came in for sharp criticism.

The fear of further military intervention increased, because the ruling BNP was known to be haunted by a rebel group critical of President Sattar and some Cabinet members. Some feared that economic dete-

³Rashiduzzaman, "Changing Political Patterns in Bangladesh: Internal Constraints and External Fears," *Asian Survey*, September, 1977.

⁴British Broadcasting Corporation report, February 15, 1982.

rioration might prompt the military to seize power. Various intraparty squabbles raised doubts about the viability of BNP as a source of stability. In poor health, the President failed to be assertive against the divisive forces in the party. Thus on March 24, citing the government's inability to end "corruption in public life and the fight for power"* in the BMP, General Ershad overthrew the Sattar government in a bloodless coup and declared himself chief martial law administrator.

BANGLADESH AND THE WORLD

The Soviet Union actively supported the creation of Bangladesh and helped India in its war with Pakistan, without which the new nation could not easily have become a reality. Soviet leaders moved swiftly to establish political ties with the newly created country. The nationalist leaders in Bangladesh were also anxious to reciprocate Moscow's friendship. For a while, some leftists supported the growing Soviet influence. The Soviet navy was active in Chittagong port to clear the ships sunk during the civil war and to help Bangladesh in modernizing its fishing industry.

However, the Soviet influence in Bangladesh soon started to fade. Along with India, the Soviet Union became unpopular when Bangladeshis began to fear that New Delhi's domination had been diplomatically legitimized by Moscow. Moderate forces were also afraid of the possible spread of radical forces under Soviet patronage. Pro-Beijing leftists were determined to undercut Soviet influence. Finally, the Soviet Union was unable to meet the growing need for economic assistance in a war-torn and food-deficient country.

Although Mujibur Rahman's government was critical of United States President Richard Nixon's support for Pakistan during the 1971 civil war, relations between Dacca and Washington gradually improved. After the assassination of Mujibur Rahman, the influence of New Delhi and Moscow in Bangladesh sharply declined and cooperation with the Western countries greatly increased.

What is at stake in Bangladesh for the United States and other Western countries? Although Bangladesh is a poor country, it occupies an important position in South Asia. If this country of more than 80 million people goes Communist, from the Western perspective it will adversely affect the South Asian balance of power. The United States and the Western allies would like to see Bangladesh continue as an independent nation without becoming an ideologically radical state. This consideration is now all the more important after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and a possible future Soviet threat toward Pakistan and South-west Asia.

In the wake of its bloody civil war, many feared that Bangladesh would gravitate towards ideological radi-

calism and the Communist bloc. On the contrary, Bangladesh has maintained friendly ties with the Western nations, and its government has criticized the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Bangladesh is also an articulate member of the non-aligned movement. Its leaders have participated in the North-South dialogue and have urged a restructuring of the world economic order and the transfer of resources from the rich to the poor nations. A predominantly Muslim country, Bangladesh has consistently supported the Arab cause in international forums and has tried to mediate the dispute between Iran and Iraq.

Among the superpowers, Communist China is closest to Bangladesh. Because of the Sino-Indian conflict, Beijing cultivates the friendship of both Bangladesh and Pakistan. Although China did not support the break-up of Pakistan in 1971, in recent years Beijing has offered diplomatic and economic assistance to Bangladesh. Inside the country, there is a great deal of support for continued friendship with China. Ties with Beijing are considered necessary as a balance against India.

In the region, India is the dominant power, and Bangladesh suffers the fears of living with a giant neighbor. India played the most important role in the creation of Bangladesh. Soon after independence in 1971, Bangladesh signed a "friendship treaty" with New Delhi under which India can intervene if the security of the new nation is threatened. About 10 percent of the Bangladeshis are Hindus, and India feels a sense of obligation toward their well-being.

Since 1972, the relationship between the two neighbors has soured over the distribution of the Ganges River water, territorial claims over certain islands, illegal immigrants, border smuggling, and trade disputes. Ziaur Rahman gradually moved away from close ties with India but did not pursue any active hostility, preferring peaceful diplomacy. Bangladesh and India have had several meetings, but the major disputes between the two countries remain unresolved.

Bangladesh and Pakistan have two outstanding disputes. One is the question of assets to be transferred to Bangladesh as its share from the once united Pakistan. The other is the repatriation of non-Bangladeshis, stranded in Bangladesh since 1972, who would like to return to Pakistan. The two countries established diplomatic relations in 1975 and negotiations are continuing to resolve the disputes.

Bangladesh's relations with its other neighbors—Nepal, Burma and Sri Lanka—have also been marked by friendship and cooperation. Burma agreed peacefully to take back the Muslim refugees who crossed the border into Bangladesh after communal disturbances. Bangladesh has taken some initiative to encourage greater economic cooperation among the South Asian countries. The government of Bangla-

*See *The New York Times*, March 25, 1982, p. 1.

desh is reportedly borrowing food from Burma to meet its 1982 grain shortage.

Some observers argue that the international community should regard Bangladesh as a test case for development, not as an arena of power diplomacy.⁵ It does not supply principal raw materials to the Western industrialized nations. Nor has it major strategic importance except to its neighbors. The case of Bangladesh figured prominently at the North-South Conference in 1981, and Bangladeshi leaders appealed to the international community to help their development efforts. International relations between the rich nations and the third world might be improved if the West demonstrates a genuine will to develop a poor country like Bangladesh; in all the nations of the third world, underdevelopment is the core question.

THE ECONOMY: A LONG ROAD AHEAD

There are at least two schools of thought on the future of Bangladesh's economy. One group of Bangladeshi economists and political leaders argue that the country needs a radical change, drastic land reform, the reduction of foreign aid dependence, more state capitalism, and the abolition of luxury goods imports. There is also a strong group advocating more free enterprise and private incentive, less state capitalism and the need for technical and economic assistance from the industrialized countries. The Sattar government seemed to advocate a mixed economy. On the one hand, state-managed and nationalized industries were spread over major sectors of the economy. On the other hand, the government was promoting the private sector and trying to attract foreign investment.

Early in February, 1982, the government of Bangladesh and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) held a four-day joint conference in Dacca to attract foreign investment. As many as 124 representatives from 30 countries and 20 financial institutions and international agencies joined local entrepreneurs to explore the prospect of future investment. Some of the projects for which memoranda were signed will develop polyester, fiber, sponge, iron, jute products, and industrial alcohol. Fruit and vegetable processing, sugar refining and the manufacture of electric cables are included. It is not yet clear how many foreign investors were attracted to Bangladesh as a result of this conference and other similar efforts.

Even in a good year, Bangladesh is a very poor

⁵Just Faaland and J. R. Parkinson, *Bangladesh: The Test Case for Development* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1976).

⁶According to unofficial estimates, the total food consumption in Bangladesh during 1981-82 would be about 15 million tons of grains. This information has been provided by the Embassy of Bangladesh in Washington, D.C.

⁷These estimates for food grain production are from R.H. Khandker, "Bangladesh: Its Long-term Economic Future" (unpublished paper).

country. More than 80 million people are crowded into a country roughly the size of Wisconsin. Cyclones, drought, floods and civil violence have plagued the economy. But despite the prediction of a Malthusian doomsday, Bangladesh has not performed badly in the last few years. From 1975 to 1980, the weather was favorable and food grain production was satisfactory. However, the 1981 drought affected grain production badly and there are indications that 1982 will be characterized by food shortages.

The exact nature of the 1981-1982 shortage is not yet clear. According to an announcement of the Food Minister, the shortage in 1981 was about 2 million tons and more than half of that deficit will be met by several donor nations.⁶ Some international agency and non-government observers put the deficit higher. During the months of January and February, 1982, food prices shot up abnormally, and many fear that hoarding, profiteering and panic buying may aggravate the food shortage.

The per acre yield in Bangladesh is always very low compared to countries under fairly similar conditions. Specialists believe that because of the agricultural potential of this fertile delta, its people could be fed according to the living standards in South Asia. To achieve self-sufficiency in food, Bangladesh has been trying high-yielding varieties of rice (IRRI). This agricultural strategy requires fertilizer, improved agricultural techniques, and irrigation facilities. With plenty of natural gas, Bangladesh can produce enough fertilizer to increase its food production. But in the meantime, Bangladesh needs technical aid and capital investment for a gas-based fertilizer industry. At least three fertilizer factories have gone into production.

However, the financial resources required for a "green revolution" in Bangladesh far outstrip available resources within and outside the country.⁷ According to current estimates, in order to attain self-sufficiency in food grain during the next 15 years, production growth must be accelerated by about 4 percent per year, assuming that per capita consumption rises as income rises. Even a 5 percent increase in food production would leave a deficit of 0.8 million tons by the end of the year 1985. It should also be remembered that during this period, the cost of agricultural inputs—fertilizer, seeds—will rise and that the burden of agricultural development falls largely on the government.

In Bangladesh, galloping population growth saps

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"Recent political and economic changes in Sri Lanka show a shift from a socialist to an entrepreneurial model of development. The lack of significant economic progress over the last two decades made such a shift welcome."

Political and Economic Development in Sri Lanka

BY TISSA FERNANDO

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SRI Lanka became independent in 1948 after nearly four and a half centuries of British rule. Its first government was formed by the United National party (UNP), a conservative, pro-Western, multiethnic coalition, whose rule was interrupted by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike's Sinhala nationalist, left-of-center Sri Lanka Freedom party (SLFP), which came to power in 1956. After Bandaranaike was assassinated in September, 1959, his widow Sirimavo Bandaranaike took control of the SLFP and emerged as one of the island's most powerful and popular politicians. She became Prime Minister in July, 1960, becoming the world's first woman Prime Minister. Although the SLFP was defeated by the UNP in March, 1965, Bandaranaike regained power in May, 1970, and governed for the next seven years, much of that time in coalition with the Trotskyite, Lanka Sama Samaja party (LSSP) and the Communist party (CP). In April 1971, her government was threatened by a massive insurrection, which she brought under control with foreign help; the following year, she changed the constitution to make the island a socialist republic. Bandaranaike remained very much in command until the UNP's stunning victory in July, 1977.¹

Between 1970 and 1977, when the SLFP coalition was in power, the UNP was quietly regrouping. For long ridiculed as the "Uncle Nephew party," the UNP had to shed its family image and its image of representing only the wealthy, in order to emerge as a credible mass party. The architects of this metamorphosis were two veteran politicians, J.R. Jayewardene and R. Premadasa. The time was right for a UNP comeback. The economic performance of the SLFP government was dismal, and there was growing discontent. Un-

employment was rising, controls of one sort or another were commonplace irritants, and so were rising costs and consumer shortages. Many regarded the 1972 republican constitution as a charter for authoritarian rule, a fear that began to have some substance when Bandaranaike used the change in the constitution to give her government two additional years in office. In addition, from April, 1971, to the end of Bandaranaike's term in 1977, the island had been ruled by emergency laws.

In the 1977 general election, the UNP won by a landslide, obtaining 139 of the 168 parliamentary seats.² The SLFP obtained only 8 seats; its former coalition partners, the CP and the LSSP, obtained none. The UNP, understandably, interpreted the results as a strong mandate to transform society.

The new government initiated fundamental political and economic changes. In 1978, the constitution was amended to introduce two radically new features: an elected executive presidency and proportional representation. Since independence, Sri Lanka had been governed according to the Westminster model: "the real power lying with the Prime Minister in Parliament, and a first-past-the post electoral system."³ The change to an executive presidency was justified on the grounds that the island needed a strong and stable government for the economic changes that were to come. Under the new constitution, Jayewardene became the President and Premadasa became the Prime Minister.

Proportional representation is also a departure from the British model. It may end the wild swings from one political party to another so characteristic of Sri Lankan elections. A more predictable consequence, it will make it virtually impossible for any political party to obtain the two-thirds majority required to amend the 1978 constitution, which enshrines UNP policy. No political party in Sri Lanka has ever received anywhere near two-thirds of the popular vote; even the UNP obtained only 50.9 percent of the vote in 1977. The two-thirds requirement for constitutional amendment may lead to problems under a proportional system. Making it difficult to change the constitution legally may, in the long run, invite extralegal initiatives.

The UNP government has so far projected a tough

¹For details on political, social and economic aspects, see A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, *Politics in Sri Lanka, 1947-1973* (London: Macmillan, 1974); Tissa Fernando and Robert N. Kearney, eds., *Modern Sri Lanka: A Society in Transition* (Syracuse: Maxwell School, Syracuse University, 1979); K.M. de Silva, ed., *Sri Lanka: A Survey* (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1977).

²Vijaya Samaraweera, "Sri Lanka's 1977 General Election: The Resurgence of the UNP," *Asian Survey*, vol. 17, no. 12 (December, 1977), pp. 1195-1206.

³"Sri Lanka Survey," *The Economist* (London), June 30, 1981, p. 14.

exterior. The 1978 law prohibiting public service strikes and politically motivated walkouts in the private sector is typical. Such prohibitions are new in a nation that is proud of its long history of trade unionism.⁴ The government argues that the island's economy cannot afford crippling strikes. In 1980, when a strike that began in a railway shop developed into a general strike, the UNP saw it as a serious challenge to its right to rule; moving decisively, the government broke the strike by dismissing several thousand workers. This unprecedented response was a massive blow to the trade union movement. No previous government responded this way to a strike, and the action confirmed the government's macho image.

The action depriving Bandaranaike of her civil rights was also an act of political bravado. A government commission, finding her guilty of abuse of power during her tenure of office, stripped her of her seat in Parliament and of her political rights for six years. In effect, Bandaranaike, Jayewardene's only serious rival will not be able to contest the next presidential election. This virtually guarantees the President a second term. Contrary to what one might expect, this action against Bandaranaike did not lead to widespread protest. Thus from the UNP's perspective, the gamble paid off: a strong opponent was neutralized without political repercussions. However, depriving a former Prime Minister of her civic rights introduces a new element into Sri Lankan politics. An impressive tradition of the Sri Lankan political scene was that it was free of political vendettas.⁵ The action may create a precedent that may seriously alter the quality of Sri Lankan politics. However, the action against the former Prime Minister was quasi-judicial in nature, although the President has the power to pardon. President Jayewardene expressed his view explicitly:

A commission was not set up especially for Mrs. Bandaranaike. The other individuals who have been found guilty by this Commission have been deprived of civil rights. So why is the sacred cow to be protected?⁶

So far, the Jayewardene government has not faced serious opposition. The opposition parties are in disarray. The SLFP is struggling to keep its own house in order. A family feud between Bandaranaike's son,

Anura (who is a member of Parliament), and her daughter, Chandrika, has split the SLFP politburo and weakened the party's effectiveness. The Marxist parties are experiencing their leanest time since their beginnings in the 1930's, while the UNP government continues to enjoy popular support.

In the countrywide municipal elections held in May, 1979, the ruling party won overwhelmingly. Similarly, in the first elections to the new district councils held in June, 1981, the UNP won control of all 18 councils in Sinhalese areas.⁷ Although all the evidence indicates that the UNP continues to have majority support in the Sinhalese areas, in the highly volatile political climate of Sri Lanka this situation could change overnight.

In domestic politics the government's biggest headache is the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict. Although communal tension has been endemic in Sri Lanka, it has only recently manifested this virulence. The causes of this conflict are complex, but ethnic tension has been exacerbated by the very nature of participatory electoral politics.⁸ Politicians of both ethnic groups have often aroused antipathies to win easy votes. The first major disturbance occurred in 1958. The next decade was relatively calm, but the 1970's saw renewed hostility. In recent years, the growth of a separatist movement in the north added fuel to the fire, and by 1976 there was clear evidence of insurgent activity in the northern province. The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) fought the 1977 election on the promise of creating a separate state for the Tamils (*Eelam*) in the north and east. In the aftermath of the election, there was a wave of communal violence; some 140 deaths were recorded, and Tamil homes and businesses in Sinhalese areas were attacked. The fact that the TULF won so handily in Tamil areas in 1977 and continues to win in subsequent elections is strong evidence that separatist sentiments are strong in the north and east.

There is little evidence that Tamils, who have traditionally lived in Sinhalese areas, want separation. But Tamils feel discriminated against in language rights, education and employment. The SLFP government was not insensitive to these grievances, but its remedies did not go far enough. The Jayewardene government began its term of office with conciliatory gestures. Tamil was made an official language, the language of administration and of the courts in predominantly Tamil regions. But inter-ethnic tension continued, fanned by self-seeking politicians of both communities. By 1978, the Tamil struggle was marked by political terrorism and murder, led by a group called "Liberation Tigers." The extremism of the radical youth caused a problem for the TULF, which shares the goal of a separate state but does not approve of violence. The TULF, the leading opposition party in Parliament, has been functioning within the constitutional

⁴V. Kumari Jayewardene, *The Rise of the Labor Movement in Ceylon* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1972).

⁵For a perceptive account of the Sri Lankan political system, see James Jupp, *Sri Lanka: Third World Democracy* (London: Frank Cass, 1978).

⁶*New Internationalist*, November, 1981, p. 13.

⁷The SLFP, LSSP and CP boycotted these elections—and it was left to the *Janata Vimukhti Peramuna* (JVP), People's Liberation Front, to provide opposition. The JVP is the group that led the 1971 insurrection; since 1977 they have been functioning as a regular political party.

⁸See Robert N. Kearney, "Language and the Rise of Tamil Separation in Sri Lanka," *Asian Survey*, vol. 18, May, 1978, pp. 521-34.

framework. However, the Tigers force the TULF to maintain a radical posture so as not to lose the support of the Tamil youth. In 1979, there were further disturbances. Attacks on Sinhalese in the north encouraged attacks on Tamils in the south. The Prevention of Terrorism Bill was passed in July, 1979, making murder, kidnapping and abduction punishable by life imprisonment. In August and September, 1979, at least 130 people were killed. The UNP government, determined to fight terrorism, declared an emergency and sent in security forces. Jayewardene resorted to a carrot and stick approach, introducing tough measures and trying to be conciliatory. Thus the government introduced a plan for the devolution of power, which would give Tamils substantial regional autonomy. The Development Council Bill of August, 1980 (which was supported in Parliament by the TULF), established development councils in each of the 24 districts, with the power to levy taxes and to legislate in crucial areas, like small and medium industry, agriculture and housing. Their authority is limited only by the overriding authority of the President and Parliament.

The first elections to the district councils were held in June, 1981. The elections were peaceful except in Jaffna, the northern capital, where there were killings. The government had barely brought these disturbances under control when attacks on Tamils began in Sinhalese areas, including suburbs of Colombo. Many lives were lost before an emergency was declared and the troops were called out.⁹ The need to defuse communal violence has brought the government and the TULF closer. The TULF has agreed to contain militancy in the north and the UNP has agreed to contain violence in Sinhalese areas. They would also cooperate to make decentralization through development councils effective. The dilemma faced by the TULF is that by working too closely with the government it may alienate its more radical supporters. As for Jayewardene, he has won admiration for his strong handling of the disturbances.

Ironically, the President's success in restoring order was not universally appreciated abroad. Some of the measures the administration used, like holding suspects incommunicado without charge, were criticized

⁹For details see *Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER)*, August 21, 1981, September 11, 1981; *The Globe and Mail*, September 15, 1981; *New Internationalist*, November, 1981, pp. 14-15.

¹⁰*Amnesty International Canadian Bulletin*, July, 1981, and November, 1981.

¹¹*New Internationalist*, November, 1981, p. 15.

¹²*Ceylon Newsletter* (Ottawa), July 15, 1981. Sri Lanka received military and/or financial aid from the U.S., Britain, Soviet Union, China, India, Pakistan, Yugoslavia, Australia and Egypt.

¹³Vijaya Samaraweera, "From Regionalism to Globalism: The Role of Nonalignment in Sri Lanka's Foreign Policy," *Asia Quarterly*, 1978, p. 291.

by foreign observers, including Amnesty International.¹⁰ Jayewardene's response is that his critics are not aware of the extent of terrorism in the north and the potential for violence in Sinhalese areas. He claims that foreign critics are "talking through their hat" in asking him to show leniency to those who commit "acts of murder, violence, arson, rape, highway robbery."¹¹

At present there is a mood of conciliation between the communities for which the UNP government can take some credit. It is impossible to predict how long this peace will last. Ethnic fundamentalism is strong in both communities, and its ability to harm must not be underestimated.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Sri Lanka's foreign policy has been determined by two factors: its proximity to India and its small size. India's influence has been indirect; Sri Lanka has never adopted India's foreign policy stance. However, good neighborliness with India has always made practical sense, never more than now when the Tamil minority is agitating for a separate state. The other factor, its size, has meant that the island's only viable defense is to be friendly with all powerful nations. Sri Lanka's active involvement in the nonaligned nations movement is a reflection of this strategy. And it has so far paid off. The international assistance that the SLFP government received from both East and West during the 1971 insurrection was seen by Bandaranaike as a vindication of nonalignment.¹²

In August, 1976, the fifth summit meeting of non-aligned nations was held in Colombo, with Sri Lanka chairing the meeting. This was a diplomatic coup for Bandaranaike. With 45 heads of government attending, Sri Lanka received unprecedented attention in the international media. The conference, the largest ever held in Sri Lanka, gave it a role in international affairs and much needed publicity for the tourist industry. Despite her active interest in nonalignment, Bandaranaike was more sympathetic to the socialist countries of the East than to the capitalist West. She established close relations with the Soviet Union and especially close ties with China. She also initiated diplomatic ties with East Germany, North Vietnam and North Korea, and broke off relations with Israel.¹³ The SLFP government's relations with the United States were at best politely cordial. This socialist tilt was consistent with domestic policy. Nor was it new; as early as 1963 the SLFP government had nationalized foreign oil companies.

With Bandaranaike's defeat in 1977, there was a change in the direction of Sri Lankan foreign policy. The Jayewardene government is pro-Western, pro-capitalist and sympathetic to the United States. Whether this is a function of ideology or practical common sense is open to debate. Certainly the pro-capitalist stance has won friends in the West; Sri Lanka

has received aid from the United States, Britain, West Germany, Sweden, Canada and Japan, as well as from international lending agencies. For instance, the UNP government has not recognized the present regime in Kampuchea and has supported seating Pol Pot's "democratic Kampuchea" in the United Nations. It has given the Voice of America permission to replace its transmitters, an action interpreted by some critics "as providing facilities to link the United States electronic surveillance system in the Indian Ocean with a ground tracking station in Australia."¹⁴ Equally significant is the recent agreement by which Coastal Corporation of Texas will receive facilities to establish an oil storage terminal in the strategic east coast port of Trincomalee.¹⁵ This move has sparked speculation that the government is considering giving base facilities at Trincomalee to the United States navy.

Although the decision to open the country to foreign investment necessitated a pro-Western stance, the UNP government has not completely abandoned Bandaranaike's foreign policy. It supports the concept of an Indian Ocean peace zone, supports liberation movements in southern Africa and strongly supports the Palestinian cause. The government has also maintained the close ties with China that Bandaranaike developed. At the same time, Sri Lanka participated in the Moscow Olympics as a conciliatory gesture to the Soviet Union.

With India, relations are less warm than they were during Bandaranaike's rule. Bandaranaike had developed a close relationship with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who is known to have disapproved of the decision to strip the SLFP leader of her civic rights. However, at a formal level, relations between the two countries are friendly. Gandhi has been supportive in her refusal to give the Tamil separatist movement any encouragement and in her strong condemnation of secessionist movements in general. The issue of "stateless" Indians, a thorn in India-Sri Lanka relations since the 1950's, has been partly resolved. Under the negotiations of 1964 and 1974, India agreed to accept repatriation of 600,000 of these (mostly tea plantation) stateless workers, while Sri Lanka was to give citizenship to the rest. Although repatriation was to have been completed by 1979, the process has been slow; nearly half a million stateless persons of Indian origin remain in Sri Lanka.

ECONOMIC POLICIES

After the 1977 electoral victory, the UNP tried to mold the Sri Lankan economy, using a Singapore-type entrepreneurial model. The SLFP had followed a socialist and collectivist strategy, including, for example,

¹⁴*FEER*, September 11, 1981, p. 21.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, December 11, 1981.

¹⁶*New Internationalist*, November, 1981, p. 12.

¹⁷Godfrey Gunatilleke, "Wealth and Welfare," *New Internationalist*, November, 1981, p. 8.

land reform, income ceilings, import and exchange controls, and cooperative undertakings. But welfare without economic growth was bound to lead to economic difficulties, and there were clear signs by the mid-1970's that the system was failing. The UNP believed that dependence on the state had sapped individual initiative. The party's approach was to encourage private enterprise by removing the controls that were stifling business activity. The changes were far reaching: Import and price controls were removed; taxes were lowered; and the currency was devalued by 46 percent. Subsidized food rations were removed and replaced with food stamps for the very poor. The President justified the removal of food rations:

We used to give rice free and it cost about 50 or 75 cents a measure. Today it is 6 rupees a measure in the world market. How can anybody buy it at 6 rupees and give it away virtually free? Whatever the consequences of it, it just can't be done.¹⁶

The government's action was part of a broader strategy of weaning Sri Lankan masses away from a welfare mentality. But such a strategy, whatever its long-term economic wisdom, hits the very poor the hardest. The UNP government has not entirely abandoned its obligations. The other pillars of the welfare system, free education and free health services, remain intact. In fact, the government has extended some services; textbooks are now provided free, and the supply of free nutritional supplements to pregnant women and malnourished children has been expanded.¹⁷

Although the government's main strategy is to encourage individual enterprise, it sponsors several capital projects that would, among other benefits, generate employment. The three major projects are the Mahaweli development scheme, the new parliamentary and administrative complex near Colombo, and a massive public housing scheme. In addition, the government is trying to attract foreign capital by establishing an Investment Promotion Zone and by encouraging tourism.

The Mahaweli project is the largest development scheme ever undertaken in Sri Lanka. The Mahaweli is the longest river on the island (206 miles) and is to Sri Lanka what the Nile is to Egypt. The SLFP government initiated the plan to harness the river to provide irrigation to the dry north central zone, thereby opening new areas for cultivation, and to provide more hydroelectricity. It is a massive undertaking, involving the construction of several dams and main and

(Continued on page 226)

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"The military relationship between Russia and Mongolia has always been very important, and Soviet leaders claim legitimacy for their military occupation and their various policies in Mongolia on military-strategic and national security grounds."

Mongolia: Pawn of Geopolitics

BY ROBERT A. RUPEN

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BECAUSE of its geographical position, Mongolia is very important to the Soviet Union; there are close ties between eastern Siberia and the Mongolian border area as well as between Ulan Bator and Moscow. (See the map of Mongolia on page 217.) Soviet military occupation extends the strategic frontier of the U.S.S.R. much farther than its legal frontier; for instance, the Soviet Transbaikalian Military District includes Mongolia.

Close coordination of the military, the secret police and the legal system has marked Mongolian experience, and that apparatus protects socialist property and collectivist norms far more vigorously and consistently than it protects individual rights or private property. The army engages in many engineering and construction projects, building roads and improving communications; it played an active role in building the Trans-Mongolian Railroad. Russian influence and activity are especially intense from Ulan Bator north to the Russian border (a similar situation may develop if the Soviets build a railroad from Kabul to the Soviet border to consolidate and develop the Soviet-Afghanistan connection).

The Mongolian population has been increasing steadily for the past 40 years, so there are no longer concerns about population decline. The birthrate is high; infant mortality is low. The population now numbers some 1.7 million. But the area of the country is enormous—600,000 square miles—and the manpower shortage remains severe. Half the population is urban and one-fourth lives in the capital city of Ulan Bator (pop. 400,000). Urbanization and education proceed faster than industrialization, and the economy remains based largely on livestock-raising.

In the past, the Mongols depended on the Chinese for labor, skilled and unskilled, and the Sino-Soviet alliance included a provision that Chinese laborers

were to work in Mongolia. There were 12,000 of these in 1960. But the Sino-Soviet split led to their deportation and a return to a severe labor shortage in Mongolia.

To settle the nomads and eliminate their primitive dwellings (yurts) have been goals of the regime for decades, but in fact many nomads still live in their native tents. Half the 400,000 people in Ulan Bator still live in yurts. Some of these tent-living urbanites move to the "suburbs" in summer, but population increases outpace housing construction and the yurt persists.¹

North of Ulan Bator, two comparatively new cities were established by Russians. Darkhan, founded in the early 1960's, boasts a population of 52,000, of whom one-third are Russians. Erdenet, a new town, has a population of 30,000, with roughly the same proportion of Russians.

The total number of livestock is still under 25 million head, despite all government efforts to increase the herds. About five million head, mostly sheep, are privately owned and the rest are owned by the Mongolian version of the collective farm, the "negdel" or cooperative; "SKhO" is the abbreviation commonly used. There are also some horses, cattle, goats and camels.

Small-scale industry includes meat-processing and other livestock-related activity. Coal sufficient to meet local needs has long been mined in Mongolia, but the new copper and molybdenum mine at Erdenet is by far Mongolia's most impressive industrial operation. Small quantities of oil were produced for a few years, and a refinery operated briefly, but that whole operation, located in the Gobi Desert in the southern part of the country, closed down several years ago. The Chinese proposal to build a steel mill at Darkhan came to naught as a consequence of the Sino-Soviet split.²

Eighty percent of Mongolia's foreign trade is with the U.S.S.R., 12 percent with East Europe, and only 8 percent with the rest of the world. The Soviet Union has for many years spent far more in Mongolia than it receives. The Soviet subsidy is substantial, but even so the economy does not seem to change very much. Economists continually increase in number and training, and nurturing them seems to be a regular indus-

¹Recent eyewitness accounts include Thomas Ewins, "The M.P.R. Today," *Asian Affairs* (London), October, 1980, pp. 309-21; and Daniel Varnet, *Le Monde* (Paris), August 27-29, 1981.

²Robert Rupen, "Mongolia," in Carol Thompson et al., eds., *Encyclopedia of Developing Nations* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982), pp. 255-60. For information on the attempt to develop oil, see Rupen, *How Mongolia Is Really Ruled* (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1979), pp. 89-90.

try. Economists, planners, five year plans, joint economic commissions, CMEA* offices and branches are everywhere. Economic coordination is a major instrument of Soviet manipulation and control.

There is a substantial Soviet military presence, and northern Mongolia is integrated with eastern Siberia. Mongolian government ministries and educational and academic institutions receive advice and sometimes orders directly from their Soviet counterparts. The Soviet Union also encourages Inner Mongolian and Tibetan discontent with Chinese control. Language, religion, history and tradition are aggressively employed.

The Soviet Union has long claimed to treat its minority groups better than China does, and there has often been an ethnic dimension in Russian-Chinese relations. Russians, Buryat Mongols and Mongolia's Khalkha Mongols have often united in anti-Chinese action or propaganda, and a religious dimension to Russian-Chinese friction has developed naturally from the historic Buryat and Khalkha commitment to Lamaist Buddhism.

The relationship between the Mongols and Buddhism and the Dalai Lama, and the use of the Tibetan language in the Mongolian church, were all casualties of the especially violent anti-religious policy and purge in the Mongolian People's Republic (M.P.R.) in the 1930's. A kind of Soviet-directed cultural genocide crudely destroyed the religious heart of the traditional Mongolian identity.

Subsequently, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's de-Stalinization and improving cooperation between China and the Soviet Union led to a few years of joint scholarly and other contacts between Russian specialists and Buryat Mongols and M.P.R. Mongols and the Chinese of Inner Mongolia and Tibet. Serious Buddhist and Tibetan studies resumed in the U.S.S.R. and the M.P.R., marked in particular by the return to the Soviet Union of the well-known linguist and Tibetan specialist, George Roerich, in 1957. This renaissance occurred in the context of improving Sino-Soviet relations and accompanied cooperative Russian, Mongolian and Chinese academic and other endeavors.

The hesitation that led ultimately to the end of Sino-Soviet cooperation was already evident in 1959; the last traces of the old policy appeared in books published in the Soviet Union and Mongolia in 1962,

*The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, also known as COMECON or CEMA.

³Victor Louis, *The Coming Decline of the Chinese Empire* (New York: Quadrangle, 1979), pp. xv, 47-50. Note similar title but quite different political message in Helene d'Encausse, *Decline of an Empire: The Soviet Social Republics in Revolt* (New York: Newsweek Books, 1979).

⁴As reported in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, August, 1981.

⁵See for example Allen Whiting, *Siberian Development and East Asia: Threat or Promise* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), p. 93.

when the larger Sino-Soviet split was far advanced. The end of Buryat Mongolian and M.P.R. cooperation with Inner Mongolia and Tibet constituted part of that split.

A new phase began to take shape in 1977 and crystallized in 1979. A book published by Victor Louis, purported Soviet secret agent and notorious semiofficial conduit for the announcements of the Soviet government, proposed that the Dalai Lama settle in Ulan Bator, making the M.P.R. the center of Buddhism.³ The book's title, *The Coming Decline of the Chinese Empire*, conveys its anti-Chinese message, which appealed to non-Chinese Asians to accept Russian support against the Chinese.


In accord with this new policy, the few thousand survivors of a far larger and more important ethnic Chinese community in Mongolia have been mercilessly attacked recently as spies and traitors, carriers of ideological and physical diseases, and plotters against the regime. Expulsion may be the logical next step, but at this writing fewer than 50 of these Chinese have been forced to leave. An accusation broadcast in August, 1981, seemed to seek scapegoats without regard to actual guilt:

The Chinese living in Mongolia were broadly involved in the anti-Mongolian activity. The considerable part of them do not participate in socially useful labor, earning their living by speculation and other dirty means. The Chinese working at construction organizations in this country. . . flagrantly violate the M.P.R. laws, damaging the state property and organizing prostitution. The use of the Chinese in espionage activity against the M.P.R. is especially dangerous, as Beijing demands from them various information concerning the economy and defence of the M.P.R. . . . For the recent three years alone, 37 Chinese were expelled from the country for espionage, appropriation of state property, smuggling of narcotics, speculation and gambling.⁴

MILITARY STRATEGY

Any definition of East Asian Siberia (EAS) that omits Lake Baikal, the corridor through which the Trans-Siberian Railroad passes just south of the lake, and the valley of the Selenga River southward into Mongolia warps the discussion of Mongolia's strategic implications, tilting it in favor of the primacy of economics over national security.⁵ These areas represent important strategic territory for the U.S.S.R., and their status affects China as well. The areas were important in the Russian civil war, in Japan's aggression in the 1930's, in the Soviet stalemate in Asia in World War II, in the Yalta negotiations, as a platform for the Soviet army's move into Manchuria and Inner Mongolia in 1945, and ever since. The Russians consider the Baikal Corridor vital to Soviet national interests.

The military relationship between Russia and Mongolia has always been very important, and Soviet leaders claim legitimacy for their military occupation and their various policies in Mongolia on military-strategic



and national security grounds. They allege that they are protecting themselves from aggression and that they have saved the Mongols from certain defeat. The Soviet version of Mongolian military history justifies and legitimizes de facto Soviet control and tries to convince the Mongols that Soviet guardianship serves their best interests. Soviet historians embroider the record, and there are monuments, museums, statues, eternal flames, anniversary ceremonies, and tales of heroic exploits.

A large Red Army contingent accompanied by a small Mongolian force liberated the Mongolian capital from the anti-Communist forces of Baron von Ungern-Sternberg in July, 1921, and established the regime that has ruled the Mongolian People's Republic (then Outer Mongolia) ever since. Military power constituted a critical aspect of the relationship from the beginning. An incident in western Mongolia a few months later provided material for dramatic myth-making and exploitation. Mongolian troops were encircled and threatened with extermination by anti-Bolshevik Russians at Tolbo-Nur for 42 days, and were able to avoid surrender and total annihilation only with the help of Bolshevik Russian forces. That siege became a literary and dramatic staple of Russo-Mongolian friendship and mutual admiration.

In the 1930's, Soviet military advisers established and trained Mongolian units, including tank and air force contingents, and the legendary Georgii Zhukov arrived in Mongolia in June, 1939, to take charge of a faltering battle against strong Japanese forces in eastern Mongolia. He is credited with victory in the Battle of Nomonkhan in September, 1939. The Zhukov Military Museum recently opened in Ulan Bator; a large monument is dedicated to him; a major street in the capital bears his name.

Combined Soviet and Mongolian forces moved into Manchuria and Inner Mongolia in mid-August, 1945, and those Mongols who took part in those operations have dominated their country's military establishment until recently. The Soviet Union's structure of legitimacy in Mongolia is built on the foundation of the joint Soviet-Mongolian victory, including the questionable Soviet claim that the Soviet Union was the primary victor over Japan in World War II. Foreign officials and others visiting Mongolia are taken to Mt. Zaisan to pay tribute at the monument and eternal flame that commemorates the Soviet soldiers who served in Mongolia in World War II.

When Soviet and Chinese troops clashed (the Damansky Island incident) at the Manchuria-Soviet bor-

der on the Ussuri River in 1969, the clash was quickly followed by extensive literature suggesting a parallel with Nomonkhan in 1939.⁶

Publicity about Marshals Joseph Stalin, Kh. Choybalsan, Y.U. Tsedenbal, and Leonid Brezhnev has come into style. Tsedenbal, previously the embodiment of the civilian technician-economist who contrasted sharply with his soldier-predecessor Choybalsan, now regularly uses the title of marshal.

MONGOLIA AND AFGHANISTAN

In December, 1980, Afghanistan's ambassador in Mongolia referred to Mongolia's "pioneer transition from feudalism to socialism." The Mongolian ambassador in Kabul is one of his country's most experienced diplomats and is a former Minister of Foreign Affairs. Soviet officials and scholars have noted that the Mongolian example is applicable to the Afghanistan case. Both Mongolia and Afghanistan obviously depend on and derive much from Soviet theory and practice. But any comparison is only suggestive, not definitive. Afghanistan's population is many times greater: 16 million compared to 1.7 million in Mongolia; Muslim culture is notably more activist and aggressive than Buddhist culture; the Soviet Muslim population adjoining Afghanistan is very much larger than the tiny Soviet Buddhist population adjoining Mongolia. But a catalogue of major policies and developments in the Mongolian People's Republic alert the observer to expect certain developments in Afghanistan.

The transition from feudalism to socialism, bypassing capitalism, is the Soviet Union's major ideological tenet in Mongolia.⁷ Even though both Islam and Buddhism are characterized as "feudal" and religion is condemned ideologically, the Communist regimes in Afghanistan and Mongolia simultaneously and paradoxically present themselves as defenders and champions of the faiths and maintain tame religious organizations.

In Mongolia, language and script were unified and the alphabet was changed to Cyrillic in 1945, and education in the new version of the traditional native language was greatly expanded. New content accompanied the new external forms: Marxist-Leninist indoctrination pervades the Mongolian educational system. A Mongolian Academy of Sciences was established with extensive Soviet advice and participation, and the academy has been closely integrated with the Soviet network of academic research.

(Continued on page 228)

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⁶John Erickson, "Reflections on Securing the Soviet Far Eastern Frontiers, 1932-1945," *Interplay*, August-September, 1969.

⁷A. Luysandendev and N. I. Nikulin, "Literature of the M.P.R. and the Ideological Struggle," *NAA*, no. 4, 1981, pp. 103-108; Sh. Nadirov, "On Construction of Socialism," *NAA*, no. 5, 1981, pp. 3-14.

"The future of Afghanistan depends largely on what happens to the Soviet occupation, how soon and in what form."

Afghanistan Under Soviet Occupation

BY NAKE M. KAMRANY

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IN the early 1980's, Afghanistan's Marxist government, led by Babrak Karmal, could not survive without the presence of several Soviet divisions in Afghanistan. Estimates of the number of Soviet soldiers and military equipment there vary considerably, because Western newsmen are barred and most resistance occurs in the countryside, far from diplomatic contact. Western sources estimate that in early 1982 there were 10 Soviet divisions in Afghanistan, between 80,000 and 100,000 soldiers; the freedom fighters estimate that there are more than three times that many. In addition, many Soviet military operations originate inside the Soviet Union, which makes counting more difficult. For instance, air operations in northern Afghanistan originate from air bases in Soviet Turkestan. According to one count, the number of Soviet tanks destroyed so far in the valley of Pandjshire alone was more than 200; others estimate the total number of Soviet tanks in Afghanistan at fewer than 100.

Afghanistan and the Afghan economy suffered a major setback because of the Soviet invasion of December, 1979, and the continued Soviet occupation. The direct economic loss has been estimated at \$2 billion a year.¹ But the cost of the war has been incalculable in terms of human lives, the destruction of hundreds of villages, and the cost in lost opportunity. About one-fifth of the population has vanished or emigrated. Many factories have shut down; the transportation system has collapsed; the government is unable to collect taxes; the farmers have refused to plant crops; shortages and inflation are endemic. From 1970 through 1977, the inflation rate averaged 4.1 percent per year, but prices of many goods in Kabul increased by over 100 percent between 1980 and 1981. The price of wheat increased by 400 percent, cooking oil by 300 percent, meat by 500 percent and wood by 200 percent. Moreover, a great deal of Afghanistan's capital equipment and many factories have been destroyed by the resistance movement in order to undermine the existing Marxist government. This has reduced the country's production capacity, and it presents enormous lost opportunities for the future of the Afghan economy. Even after hostilities cease, it will take years

to restore the Afghan economy to its pre-invasion level.

In the meantime, the Afghan economy will become more and more dependent on the Soviet Union, and the process of Sovietization, the economic integration of Afghanistan with the Soviet Union, will increase rapidly. Today, more than 90 percent of Afghanistan's foreign aid is provided by the Soviet Union, in contrast to about 40 percent in the pre-invasion period. The Soviet venture is clearly costly in the short run, although its implications for the long run are incalculable. However, there is no doubt that any representative Afghan government will be very hostile to the Soviet Union.

Over the last quarter century, great strides were made in the modernization of Afghanistan. Between 1955 and 1980, over \$3 billion in foreign aid was invested under a series of five year economic plans; the first plan was initiated in 1956. Beginning in the mid-1950's, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in every conceivable kind of nonmilitary competition in Afghanistan—mass media propaganda, technical assistance, exchange scholarships, infrastructure building, and a host of other cold war techniques. The concerted efforts produced some positive and some negative results. On the positive side, a network of much needed infrastructure was created, including a system of paved roads connecting the major cities. The system of education was expanded substantially from the elementary to the university level, and student enrollment increased by over 1,000 percent over the last 25 years. Many hospitals, several airports, and a meager system of communications were established. Major irrigation and power projects in the southwest (the Helmand Valley Project) and in the east (the Naghlu project) were completed. Mineral and resource surveys revealed rich resources in Afghanistan, especially in natural gas, iron ore, zinc and oil. Substantial quantities of natural gas were exported to the Soviet Union although at prices far below international prices or the prices the Soviet Union charged its West European customers.

In their search for economic improvement, the Afghans viewed East-West competition in Afghanistan as beneficial, hoping that complementary projects would yield overall economic development. But in spite of

¹*Afghanistan Times*, vol. 1, no. 2 (April, 1980).

the \$3 billion in foreign aid, the life of most Afghans did not improve appreciably. The Afghan leadership was unable to articulate a sound economic strategy that would attract popular support. But the major reason for the failure of foreign aid in Afghanistan was the fact that the superpowers were following their own political objectives. Roads were designed for tanks, and airports were built for major military operations rather than to support or foster economic development. Today, half the roads and airports in Afghanistan that are being used by the Soviet military were built by the United States as part of its aid program.

Thus, in spite of the magnitude of the foreign investment, the level of productivity in Afghanistan did not change appreciably, and the corresponding increase in the level of direct productive activities did not materialize. Instead, Afghanistan became an essentially dualistic economy. Living conditions in the rural areas, some 20,000 villages, remained unchanged. On the other hand, many urban centers like Kabul, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-i-Shariff expanded very rapidly, and prosperous urban Afghans began to enjoy the comforts of modern life, including modern hotels, paved streets, radio and television (only in Kabul), modern hospitals, department stores and markets, luxurious houses, and urban services, including international air service.

This dichotomy led to the migration of able workers from the rural to the urban sector, depleting the rural sector of its valuable human resources and, at the same time, creating high unemployment in the modern wage-earning sector of the economy. Moreover, this rapid influx of people into the urban centers created pockets of urban poverty. In Kabul, the bottom 56 percent of all households earn only 15 percent of the income, while the top 6 percent earn 49.2 percent. Moreover, looking at the overall macroeconomic performance of the economy, the per capita gross national product (GNP) remained below \$250, which makes Afghanistan one of the least developed countries in the world.²

The future of Afghanistan depends largely on what happens to the Soviet occupation, how soon and in what form. Clearly, an understanding of Afghanistan's history and the factors that led to the Soviet invasion are necessary to understand the problems facing Afghanistan in the decade of the 1980's.

For over two millennia, Afghanistan has existed as an

independent country under various names, like Aryana, Bactria and Khorasan. Modern Afghanistan was founded by Ahmed Shah Ba Ba in 1747. British and Russian intervention started in the 1830's, when the country was caught in a civil war and rival rulers sought outside assistance. This pattern of civil war and foreign intervention in Afghanistan has continued.³

BRITISH INTENTIONS

The British objective in Afghanistan was security for India against Russia. In pursuit of this objective, the British invaded Afghanistan, and this led to the Anglo-Afghan wars of 1839-1842 and 1878-1880. At the same time, the Russians were expanding southward. The Russians occupied the Caucasus, the Trans-Caspia, Turkestan (Turkmenia) and the Khanates of Central Asia. In this process of expansion, Russia came within the sphere of British interests, especially when it occupied Turkestan on the northern border of Afghanistan and occupied an Afghan border town in 1885.⁴

Anglo-Russian arrangements with regard to Afghanistan necessitated a series of agreements to create an Anglo-Russian détente. Discussions were held in London (1885), Khamiab (1886), St. Petersburg (1887), Chehl Duktaran (1893) and Pamir (1895). A series of protocols concerned the borders of northern and northwestern Afghanistan. The Granville-Gortchakoff agreement of 1873 defined the northern frontier of Afghanistan as the (Amu Derya) Oxus River. The last of the meetings between Great Britain and Russia was held in 1907. In the Anglo-Russian Convention of St. Petersburg, Afghanistan was declared to lie outside the Russian sphere of influence, and Great Britain promised to refrain from annexation or interference in Afghan affairs.

In 1919, King Amanullah launched the third Anglo-Afghan War, which resulted in the Treaty of Rawalpindi, in which Afghanistan's full sovereignty was acknowledged. At the same time, the Bolshevik Revolution swept through Russia, and a Communist regime was established in that vast country. The government of King Amanullah and the Bolshevik regime both craved international recognition. The Soviet Union was first to recognize Afghanistan as a sovereign nation, and its action was reciprocated by Afghanistan. An Afghan-Russian treaty of friendship was signed in August, 1921.

TREATY ARRANGEMENTS

According to the treaty, the Soviet Union guaranteed the independence of Bokhara and promised to return Panjdeh to Afghanistan. In 1926, at Paghman, Afghanistan signed another treaty of neutrality and nonaggression with the Soviet Union. A group of Afghan students were subsequently sent to Moscow for flight training, and they formed the core of Afghanistan's air force for the next 30 years. Agreement for

²For more information on Afghanistan, see Nake M. Kamrany in Carol L. Thompson et al., eds., *Encyclopedia of Developing Nations* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982). See also Leon B. Poullada, *Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973).

³Najib Ullah, "Afghanistan in Historical Perspective," in *Current Problems in Afghanistan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).

⁴William Habberton, *Anglo-Russian Relations Concerning Afghanistan: 1837-1907* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1937).

air service between Kabul and Tashkent was reached in 1927.⁵

During the same period, King Amanullah sent a mission to Washington, D.C. But the mission was not officially recognized nor was the United States persuaded to recognize Afghanistan.⁶

From the 1930's through the mid-1950's, Afghanistan's economic, political and social relations with the Soviet Union were minimal. In 1953, Sardar Mohammed Daud became Prime Minister; and in 1956, he launched Afghanistan's first five year development plan and sought Soviet economic and technical support.⁷

In the 1950's, the United States was providing only marginal aid to maintain its presence. The United States had zeroed in on "palace and politics" and had supported the status quo. But eventually all United States efforts to encourage the development of a democratic process in Afghanistan failed. Although some beginning was made during the 1963-1973 constitutional period, the formation of political parties was not permitted by King Zahir, and the educated elite failed to unify and rally behind a single leadership.

During this period, the United States refused repeated Afghan requests for military assistance, largely because of its treaty commitments to Pakistan and the regional dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan over Pashtunistan. The United States kept Afghanistan out of its security pacts, namely the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in the 1950's; it consistently viewed Afghanistan as outside its security perimeter.

SOVIET INFILTRATION

At the same time, the Soviet Union was planting the seeds of the subsequent Soviet takeover. Soviet personnel infiltrated the military, providing military hardware and training for junior officers. Pragmatic aid programs gave the Soviet Union a four-to-one edge over the United States. Soviet leaders were careful to bind the Afghan economy to that of the Soviet Union through a series of barter agreements and programs providing massive training of junior executives especially designed to convert them into loyal members of the leftist parties, Khalq and Parcham, which received steady and strong Soviet support.

⁵Arnold Fletcher, *Afghanistan: Highway of Conquest* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965); L. Dupree, *Afghanistan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973); Hasan Kakar, *Afghanistan History* (Houston: University of Texas Press, 1979) and Ludwig Adamec, *Afghanistan's Foreign Affairs to the Mid-Twentieth Century* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1974).

⁶Poullada, "Afghanistan and the United States: The Crucial Years," in *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 35, no. 2 (spring, 1981).

⁷Kamrany, *Peaceful Competition in Afghanistan* (Washington, D.C.: CSC Press, 1969).

Afghan interest in marxism had developed out of sheer frustration. Although Afghan Marxists were few in numbers, they had become strong zealots. They had a very superficial understanding of marxism and they viewed the world as belonging either to the Marxist Soviet sphere or the capitalist American sphere. Because the Soviet Union was promoting a shake-up of the status quo, the leftists saw their opportunity to grab power and topple the monarchy.

But in 1973, it was the military officers influenced by the Soviet Union who overthrew the monarchy and established the first leftist government under Sardar Daud, their figurehead. Subsequently, when Daud tried to consolidate his power and move away from the Soviet sphere, the military toppled him and established a more reliable leftist regime, headed by Nôor Mohammed Taraki, a Marxist, who was named President of the "Democratic Republic of Afghanistan." The Soviet Union tried to popularize Taraki as the "great teacher," but his only credentials lay in an article he wrote about the conditions of work and the workers, for which he was awarded the Lenin Prize, including some \$70,000 that had helped him organize his party.

By all accounts, the 1978 coup was engineered directly by the Soviet Union, and Soviet pilots dropped the decisive bombs on the palace. The Taraki regime subsequently met with stiff popular resistance and civil war. Over time, the regime weakened and, acting on Soviet advice, Taraki finally tried to eliminate his deputy, H. Amin, who was the real force in the Khalq organization; Amin had also served as a liaison between the party and the military, thus enlarging his personal power. In the struggle, Amin had the upper hand; he was tipped off about the Taraki plan by Taraki's head of security, S. D. Taloon. Thus in September, 1979, Taraki was murdered, and Amin took over.

Amin was fully aware of his precarious predicament. In subsequent months, however, Amin's rift with the Soviet Union grew, but he had already preempted his options. The end came in December, 1979. While the United States was caught off balance in Iran, the Soviet Union launched its invasion, summarily executed Amin, and installed Babrak Karmal, head of the Marxist party, Parcham, as President.

There were several reasons for the 1979 Soviet invasion. Soviet leaders wanted to counter United States forces in the Indian Ocean, exploiting a political opportunity while the United States was distracted by the hostage crisis. If they did not act, they feared a reversal of Soviet gains in Afghanistan over the past 30 years. Soviet leaders also wanted to take advantage of potential economic gains by capturing Afghanistan's mineral resources and making Afghanistan a "bread basket" for the Soviet Union. Soviet paranoia over the Chinese border threats was also a factor. And, finally, the Soviet

Union was responding to its historical drive, looking toward expansion to the south and warm water ports.⁸

THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE

Although the Soviet Union succeeded in penetrating the Afghan army and the air force and eventually established a Marxist government, since the invasion it has not been able to attract popular support for the Marxist government, nor has it been able to quiet the resistance. In February, 1982, in what *The Economist* (London) called an "unusually frank account of the war," the Soviet army newspaper *Red Star* reported that Soviet soldiers have a "very, very difficult life" in Afghanistan; and a report from Delhi declared that a Soviet general had been killed in a helicopter shot down by a guerrilla rocket.⁹ All told, the number of Soviet deaths has been estimated at between 15,000 and 30,000 soldiers, with more than 1,000 tanks destroyed.¹⁰ Soviet leaders are reported to be considering doubling the number of soldiers in Afghanistan, now totaling some 100,000.

Moreover, the Soviet Union has had no success in building any support for the regime of Babrak Karmal, in spite of the fact that most of Karmal's unpopular modernization programs have been canceled, including plans for land reform, adopting a new flag, and returning confiscated properties.

Afghan resistance has broad grassroots support. Hundreds of schoolgirls have challenged the Soviet occupation by demonstrating in the streets of Kabul on several occasions. Over 2 million Afghans have left their villages and have settled in the border areas of Pakistan and Iran.¹¹ Military officers and troops have turned against the Soviet forces, defecting with large supplies of military hardware, including tanks. Even Marxist Afghans in the government have begun to turn against the Soviet Union, either through defection or cooperation with the resistance. Schoolteachers, shopkeepers, farmers, university professors, diplomats and Afghans from every walk of life have joined the resistance. This is a national response with historical

precedent. The Afghans fought Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, and other invaders; the Soviet army is no exception.

Moreover, the Afghan response to the Soviet occupation is a cultural-religious reaction to a military technology. Afghanistan consists of 20,000 villages, and the Afghan's duty to protect his village is supreme. The Soviet troops will have to fight in every village to conquer the country. Soviet soldiers are regarded by the Afghans as infidels; an Afghan who loses his life on the battlefield is called a Shaheed, one who will be rewarded by God.¹²

Quelling the resistance is made even more difficult because its organization is decentralized. There are hundreds of groups of freedom fighters (mujahiddin) inside Afghanistan, and several groups are organized in the border areas of Pakistan and Iran. (In Pakistan, there are at least 28 groups.)

Cooperation is growing among these various groups. Recently three major groups formed a union, Haraket-i-Inqilab Islami, Jabhi-i-Millie Nijat, and Mahaz-i-Millie Islami. Other major groups, like Hizb-i-Islam, Jamiate-i-Islami, and the Alliance, are in the process of broadening their organizational structure to find agreement for a united front. Thus, the Afghan nationalist movement has demonstrated its resiliency and is creating a viable alternative for Afghanistan.¹³

There has also been a persistent international protest against the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. In three United Nations General Assembly votes on Afghanistan, the Soviet Union was humiliated and censured. In November, 1981, the United Nations General Assembly voted 116 to 23 to demand withdrawal of "the foreign troops" from Afghanistan. "This margin represents an increase of four affirmative votes over the tally in November, 1980, and an increase of seven votes over the original ballot in January, 1980."¹⁴

SOVIET STRATEGY

Since the invasion, the Soviets have followed two strategies. A military strategy of attrition has attempted to terrorize the entire population. Hundreds of villages have been bombed, and the Soviet military has employed chemical and biological warfare. Casualty estimates are close to one million dead, and some two and a half million Afghans have left their villages for refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran.

In addition, the Soviet-backed government has instituted a program of Sovietization to uproot every Afghan institution. The university system, the educational system, city planning, national planning, do-

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⁸These points were discussed in a conference on Afghanistan that was held at the University of Southern California in February, 1981.

⁹*The Economist* (London), February 27, 1982, p. 54.

¹⁰For Western estimates of between 10,000 and 12,000, see "New Outlook in the Afghan Fighting: Serious Trouble for Moscow Forces," *The New York Times*, August 7, 1981.

¹¹Mobin Shorish, "The Afghan Refugees in Iran," *Afghanistan Times*, vol. 2, no. 5 (January/February, 1981).

¹²F. Kakar, "Understanding the Afghan Mind," *Afghanistan Times*, vol. 2, no. 6 (July/August, 1981).

¹³Kamrany, "Mujahiddin: Freedom-Fighters of Afghanistan," *Afghanistan Times*, vol. 1, no. 4 (November, 1980). See also, "Afghanistan: New Lesson to the Soviets," *Afghanistan Times*, vol. 1, no. 2 (April, 1980).

¹⁴Eliza Van Hollen, "Afghanistan: 2 Years of Occupation," Report no. 91 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, December, 1981).

Nake M. Kamrany has published several books and many articles on economic development and technological change.

BOOK REVIEWS

ON SOUTH ASIA

ROOTS OF CONFRONTATION IN SOUTH ASIA. By Stanley Wolpert. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. 222 pages, selected bibliography, notes and index, \$14.95.)

Stanley Wolpert feels that "the basic facts of South Asian geopolitical, as well as cultural, reality appear to remain almost as remote from modern American consciousness as the vast subcontinent itself." The Russian invasion of Afghanistan in December, 1979, came as an unexpected and rude shock to the United States in spite of the fact that Russia, first imperialist and then Communist, has been inching through Central Asia toward the Persian Gulf "for more than a century." Today, more than 80,000 Soviet troops are in Afghanistan, supporting the Soviet puppet regime of Prime Minister Babrak Karmal and attempting to pacify the country.

The United States naval presence in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean increased dramatically as the Soviet threat to Pakistan and Persian Gulf oil became a reality. Wolpert believes that for an effective United States policy in the years ahead, some "consideration of [the] subcontinent's history" is important in order "to unearth the important roots that have gone into the making of the modern nations in the region."

Wolpert examines the history of the South Asian countries over the centuries, including their relations with both Russia and the West, and brings us up to date. He believes that "for South Asia a new arms race has just begun." He declares that the United States should not ally itself with any one nation or group, should reduce military exports and support and, instead, should invest in hospitals, improved agriculture, sanitation and schools and libraries "throughout South Asia," to support "freedom and self-determination for all. . . ." O. E. S.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF SOUTH ASIA: A Guide to Information Sources. By Richard J. Kozicki. (Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1981. 166 pages, appendix, bibliographies and author and subject indexes, \$38.00.)

Richard Kozicki has compiled a wealth of information in this annotated bibliography of English-language books and articles about the nations of South Asia. The countries included are India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Afghanistan. South Asia is treated as a whole in one section, and the individual countries are listed, along with information on research sources. Publications are arranged by author in another sec-

tion; the author index itself is cross referenced; and the appendix contains a bibliography. O. E. S.

THE STRUGGLE FOR AFGHANISTAN. By Nancy Peabody Newell and Richard S. Newell. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1981. 236 pages, appendix, notes and index, \$16.97, cloth; \$6.95, paper.)

AFGHANISTAN: KEY TO A CONTINENT. By John C. Griffiths. (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1981. 225 pages, references and index, \$20.00.)

AFGHANISTAN: THE SOVIET INVASION IN PERSPECTIVE. By Anthony Arnold. (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1981. 126 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$9.95.)

The authors of all three of these timely books on Afghanistan agree on the geopolitical and strategic importance of Afghanistan in the world power balance and in the "great game" of superpower diplomacy.

Nancy Peabody Newell and Richard S. Newell, authors of *The Struggle for Afghanistan*, are specialists; they have lived in Afghanistan and have traveled there extensively. In their view, the "misjudgment of Soviet intentions toward Afghanistan is the root" of the calamity that befell Afghanistan and Western diplomacy; as they see the situation today, "Soviet control of Afghanistan means that there is no creditable Western defense of the Persian Gulf." The authors provide the reader with a well-written and coherent account of the land and people of Afghanistan, the influence of the Marxists and of the Soviet Union, Afghan politics, especially since 1953, the Soviet invasion and the continuing Afghan resistance. The geopolitical and historical role played by Afghanistan is analyzed. An excellent map of Afghanistan makes Soviet planning in the area plain—paved roads link the Soviet Union with Afghanistan and with Pakistan.

"To be effective," the authors write, "an American response [to the Soviet invasion] must come soon and it must be adept." However, they warn that the United States must "enlist the cooperation of the Muslim states of the region and the acquiescence of India." "A great deal of innovative diplomacy [will] be required to demonstrate an American willingness to support rather than to lead or dominate. . . ." The United States, the authors conclude, must openly champion an Islamic revival and cooperate with the independent states of the region. Excellent photographs illustrate the well-written account.

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CURRENT DOCUMENTS

After United States Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane J. Kirkpatrick outlined the United States position on Afghanistan to the United Nations General Assembly on November 18, 1981, the General Assembly passed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The texts of the Kirkpatrick statement and the United Nations resolution follow, along with a United States State Department statement issued the next day, November 19, 1981.

THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

Ambassador Kirkpatrick

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, launched on Christmas Eve nearly 2 years ago, was a momentous event that altered the climate and, indeed, the course of world politics. The invasion was a grave violation of the U.N. Charter, which enjoins all members to "... refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. . . ." As such, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan shook the very foundations of world order.

The far-reaching consequences of this event should by now be apparent to all of us. It had a shattering effect upon the prospects for the continued stability of South Asia and the Persian Gulf, deepening anxieties throughout this vital region and raising the specter of a wider conflict. It also severely aggravated tensions between East and West. More than any single event in recent years, the Soviet invasion impelled a widespread reassessment of the world situation based upon a new and more sober appreciation of the danger that the policies of the Soviet Union now pose to global stability and world peace. The invasion thus marked a watershed in the postwar era, bringing to a definitive conclusion a period of optimism concerning the evolution of Soviet policy and intentions.

Nowhere, of course, have the consequences been more immediately or harshly felt than in Afghanistan itself. No sector of Afghan society has been spared the consequences of the Soviet occupation and the ruthless effort to impose upon the Afghan people a Communist totalitarian system—an effort that began in 1978 with the initial Communist coup overthrowing the Daud government. Almost 3 million people—about one-fifth of the entire Afghan population—have been forced to flee their country and now constitute the largest single refugee group in the world. Tens of thousands of people have been killed. Afghanistan's educated class has been decimated. Whole villages have been destroyed, their inhabitants killed or forced to flee. Mosques have been desecrated and religious leaders jailed or murdered. Schools have been turned into centers of political indoctrination. The country's economic and social infrastructure of roads, power and communication networks, hospitals, and educa-

tional institutions have been badly damaged and in many instances completely destroyed.

It is rarely noted that Afghanistan made significant economic and social progress during the decade of democratic freedoms and representative government brought about by the 1964 constitution. All this—and more—has now been undone.

There have been many attempts in the past to conquer Afghanistan. But nothing in the country's long history—with the possible exception of the devastating attacks more than 750 years ago by Genghis Khan—resembles the destruction wreaked in Afghanistan since 1978.

The Soviet Union and the Kabul regime have tried to conceal this destruction by sealing the country off from journalists and other foreign observers and from humanitarian organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross. Nevertheless, the truth about the situation there and about the terrible human suffering is becoming known to the world.

How far the Soviets are willing to go in their war against Afghanistan is indicated by the kind of weapons they have used there, including little booby-trap mines which the Soviets scatter by the thousands along the paths used by the refugees and other civilians. These mines are frequently disguised as ordinary household items or toys. Children, naturally the least wary, are the ones most likely to pick them up. If they do, they risk being killed or having their limbs blown off.

On April 10 of this year, the Soviet Union signed an international convention prohibiting the use of such weapons. At the time, its permanent representative to the United Nations called the convention "an illustrative example of the possibility of reaching agreements on measures aimed at curbing the arms race." The real "illustrative example," however, is contained in the Soviets' continued use in Afghanistan of the kind of antipersonnel weapons prohibited by the treaty. It is an example that illustrates both the character of the Soviet Union's involvement in Afghanistan and its attitude—in this instance, at least—toward a treaty obligation.

In this connection, there are many reports from refugees and other victims of the Soviet invasion that

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INDIA ENTERS THE 1980's

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support for Pakistan--with whom India has fought three wars--as destabilizing. Some officials in India's Ministry of External Affairs also privately express concern that military links between the United States and Pakistan may force India into greater strategic dependence on the Soviet Union.

India does not object to Pakistan upgrading its military capability. Indeed, a secure, coherent and stable Pakistan is in India's interest. But the introduction of such sophisticated (and, in India's view, inappropriate) weapons as the F-16 fighter bomber, which is a generation ahead of planes now in use by either India or Pakistan, can only heighten tension and contribute to greater insecurity in the region. A stable South Asia will be better able to resist superpower penetration, by the Soviet Union or the United States.

Perhaps operating from this assumption as well as recognizing that under no circumstances can Pakistan win a war against its powerful neighbor and traditional adversary, Pakistan's President Zia ul-Haq has proposed a "no-war pact" with India. Although Gandhi initially dismissed the offer contemptuously as "a trap," India (which first proposed such a pact in 1949) later responded, and in February, 1982, Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha Shahi went to New Delhi to talk to his Indian counterpart, Narasimha Rao. On that occasion, Gandhi offered to begin negotiations toward a treaty of friendship with Pakistan. Serious differences divide the two nations, not the least of which is Kashmir, but the "war clouds" which Gandhi saw on the horizon a year earlier seem today less threatening.

India's development over the past 35 years has been impressive. Despite disarray within political parties, corruption and inefficiency in state government, and violence that has captured national headlines, India's parliamentary system is deeply rooted and has a legitimacy that will not easily be lost. The economy remains a half-filled vessel, bemoaned by those who see only poverty, inequality and disparity but applauded by those who see self-sufficiency in agriculture, growth in industry, and more Indians better off now than they have ever been. In the international context, while it is wary of its neighbors and fearful of great power penetration, India is today the dominant power of the subcontinent and a rising middle power in global terms. In the 1980's, India is facing its many problems with confidence and a determination to move forward. ■

PAKISTAN: A NEW "FRONT-LINE" STATE?

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like fashion, Pakistan has been careful to maintain economic ties with the Soviet Union and to continue

diplomatic discussion of the major outstanding issue, the Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Pakistan's new line of attack on the old problem of finding a viable civilian political order may buy time in the short run but appears destined ultimately to encounter the same difficulties as earlier experiments. Like national legislative bodies in the 1950's and 1960's, Zia's appointed Majlis-i-Shura lacks an electoral link to the people. If the Majlis merely rubberstamps the military regime's policies, it will be criticized as a facade. If it criticizes the government, as it seems prepared to do, it is likely to be abolished, or at least severely restricted.

Zia's hard-line repression of political dissidence has also bought time, but at the cost of increasingly violent anti-government outbreaks. The execution of Bhutto, the extended periods of confinement for Begum Bhutto, Benazir, and other political leaders, the restrictions on partisan activity and the elimination of the courts as a channel of redress have left a political vacuum that more violent forms of protest appear ready to fill.

It is possible that repression and political experiments will continue to maintain the present regime in power for some time, especially if the economy remains fairly strong. Whether that will provide Zia and his fellow generals sufficient time to find their way out of the martial law labyrinth remains to be seen.

Within this political and economic context, Pakistan's new status as a "front-line" state and its new security relationship with the United States present opportunities as well as dangers. In its relations with India, Pakistan has already defused a potentially explosive situation. Development funds channeled to Baluchistan may succeed in reducing separatist feelings there. But unless and until Pakistan finds a solution to its primary political problem—that of finding some form of legitimate representative government—the dangers of violent protest, disruption and uncertainty will remain. ■

BANGLADESH TODAY

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modest economic growth. Since 1970, food production increased by an average rate of 1.7 percent a year while the population increased by about 2.7 percent annually. The government is committed to a population control program and received huge international assistance for family planning activities during recent years. Family planning activities are conducted under the supervision of the Ministry of Population Control and a network of organizations at the village level. The government distributes free contraceptives and offers other birth control services to the people. It has also conducted sterilization programs. However, fertility

control in a country is intertwined with socioeconomic development, and it takes years before a population control program shows tangible results.

The economy was particularly strained in the months following the suspension by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) of its loan to Bangladesh. Bangladesh had received approval for a \$1-billion loan from the IMF spread over a three year period; only seven months later the loan was suspended. In the aftermath of Zia's assassination, the government was unable to make hard economic decisions, but the IMF is asking Bangladesh to exert fiscal discipline. Bangladesh was reportedly heading for a deficit of nearly \$270 million in the last fiscal year, a deficit unacceptable to the IMF. The international lending agency asked the government to reduce the import of foreign goods, raise the prices of goods manufactured in nationalized industries, tighten internal credit, and increase exports.⁸ The IMF is known to be willing to reinstate the loan (including the missed payments) provided it is convinced that Bangladesh has begun to enforce monetary discipline. Meanwhile, the IMF has released \$68 million as compensatory financing.

Bangladesh relies heavily on foreign aid from the West. So far, the annual aid has amounted to about \$600 million. As the Western economy slumps, the possibility of further foreign aid is dim. The prospect of a large-scale transfer of resources from rich countries to Bangladesh is not likely. Although most Western nations have shown their interest in helping Bangladesh, foreign aid has not been adequate for its enormous needs.

With declining exports, Bangladesh is facing an enormous balance of payments problem in 1981-1982. It was reported in December, 1981, that Bangladeshi foreign exchange had fallen to about \$230 million. Even the entire volume of foreign exchange is not adequate to import basic necessities. Unless Bangladesh can diversify its export capabilities, its chronic foreign exchange shortage will continue. Today, its main exports are jute and tea. While housing industries in the Western world are affected by economic recession, the export of jute products is in decline.* For the last few years, Bangladeshi tea export levels have not been satisfactory; there is an oversupply of Asian and African tea. In recent years, Bangladesh has been trying to increase its exports of fish, shrimp and vegetables. However, it cannot expect to increase such exports much without creating domestic scarcities.

Bangladesh is known to have vast reserves of natural gas hitherto not fully utilized for industrial purposes. The policymakers in Bangladesh are expected to make a major decision in the near future about the large-scale exploitation of natural gas for fertilizer, power

and the chemical industries. An industrialization process accelerated by natural gas resources might improve the economy. However, gas-based industries call for high technology and huge capital investment, neither of which is readily available.

CONCLUSION

Bangladesh, a country already burdened by economic woes, is again faced with political uncertainties. Sustaining a democratic system was no easier than improving the economy. Despite military uprisings, three elections in the last four years demonstrated that the idea of democracy still inspires millions of Bangladeshis. Bangladesh has an articulate political elite that refuses to accept a continued military dictatorship, the same elite which, with popular support, fought a civil war against the Pakistani military and carved out a national entity for Bangladesh. ■

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SRI LANKA

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distributary canals, and about 200 miles of new road.¹⁸ Although initially conceived as a 30-year plan, the government is trying to complete the project in under eight years. The accelerated program calls for massive capital investment. International goodwill is reflected in the promise of aid for two-thirds of its foreign currency costs. However, because of inflation cost estimates have skyrocketed. The government has been forced to scale down the plan to three dams instead of five, and to reduce the area of land to be irrigated. Even so, the final cost is expected to reach \$2 billion. As a result, this project is swallowing more and more of total public investment, from 23 percent in 1977 to 28 percent in 1981 to an estimated 31 percent in 1983. Other public spending has been sacrificed to meet the growing demands of this project. However, if all goes well the sacrifices may be well worth it, for the potential rewards are great: self-sufficiency in food and energy. Critics of the accelerated project argue that a policy of too much too soon means neglecting human factors, like the need for skills and technological aptitude. Without the human element all the aid and engineering miracles in the world will not realize the Mahaweli's potential.¹⁹

Although heavy expenditure on the Mahaweli project can be defended as necessary for the future well-being of the island, the big spending solution to the ills of Colombo—the plan to create a new administrative capital nearby—is less easily justified. Given the

¹⁸For details see special report on "The Mahaweli Ganga Development Project," *Economic Review* (People's Bank, Sri Lanka), November/December, 1978, pp. 3-22; special issue on "The Mahaweli Development Scheme," *Vidurava* (Bulletin of the National Science Council of Sri Lanka), vol. 3, no. 2 (June, 1978).

¹⁹*New Internationalist*, November, 1981, p. 27.

*Jute is used for carpet backing and for burlap bags.

⁸*The Washington Post*, November 21, 1981.

poverty of Sri Lanka, this project smacks of extravagance. More popular is the ambitious housing project, a plan to build 100,000 units, mostly on a self-help basis. According to this scheme, building materials and land are to be provided by the state, and the potential occupant is to provide labor. All these schemes have stimulated the island's construction industry, which was ailing under the SLFP regime.

A major economic innovation is the Investment Promotion Zone (IPZ) near Colombo.²⁰ Foreign companies are asked to bring their industries to the zone and are given incentives, like tax exemptions, for up to 10 years. Another attraction is the large educated labor pool in the zone and the highly competitive wage rates. A government advertisement boasts: "The average monthly wage in manufacturing industries in Sri Lanka is only US\$38. Compare your wage bill with this!"²¹ To allay fears of expropriation by future governments, article 157 of the constitution has entrenched investment-protection agreements. The administration of the IPZ has been invested in a single autonomous agency, so that investors are free to carry on their business without the usual bureaucratic delays and administrative controls, as well as the customs procedures that normally apply. Already more than 30 factories have begun production or plan to do so soon. Most of the companies investing are garment industries wanting to exploit low wage rates. Technological industries are also trickling in, including major companies like the Swiss-based corporation, Nestlé S.A., and the United States multinational, Motorola.

The government is trying to achieve two major objectives with the IPZ. The first is to help bring Sri Lanka into the industrial age. Most Sri Lankan industries have survived only because of the protection they enjoy in the domestic market. Insulated from foreign competition, they profit from domestic sales; they are not export-oriented. It is hoped that the IPZ will "act as a catalyst and provide the momentum to activate a virtually dormant manufacturing sector."²² The other objective, no less important, is to create employment for the ever growing pool of educated urban youth. It is anticipated that the IPZ will provide at least 5,000 jobs directly²³ and generate many more in ancillary activities like transportation, communications, advertising and entertainment.

²⁰For details see H.N.S. Karunatilake, "The Export Processing Zone as a Component of the New Economic Policy," *Vidurava*, vol. 2, no. 4 (December, 1977), pp. 1-4; W.D. Lakshman, "A Free Trade Zone in Sri Lanka," *Social Science Review*, vol. 1, September, 1979, pp. 76-112.

²¹*Asia Year Book* (New York: Barrons, 1981), p. 247.

²²Karunatilake, *op.cit.*, p. 11.

²³*Ceylon Daily News*, June 1, 1978.

²⁴Lakshman, *op.cit.*, p. 85.

²⁵Morris D. Morris, *Measuring the Condition of the World's Poor: The Physical Quality of Life Index* (New York: Pergamon, 1979).

²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 104.

It is far too early to provide a fair assessment of the IPZ, which is an interesting experiment for Sri Lanka. The government is optimistic that it will help to change the plantations-based economy of the island. Its critics are less sure, for both practical and ideological reasons. At a practical level, critics question whether the IPZ will deliver the goods, in terms of foreign exchange and employment. At an ideological level, they object to the exploitative nature of the IPZ, where labor laws are less stringently applied and strikes are illegal. Furthermore, they point out the potential for conflict between the interests of the nation and the foreign investor's interests, because "the motive of private profit generally pays little heed to considerations of social justice and balanced progress or to national sentiments."²⁴

The potential of tourism as a foreign exchange earner was first recognized by Bandaranaike's government, and the current government is continuing that tradition. Tourism has grown dramatically over the last decade; tourist arrivals in Sri Lanka increased from 56,000 in 1972 to 321,000 in 1980. Tourism is also attractive as a source of employment; those employed by this industry increased from 32,000 in 1977 to over 50,000 in 1980. Negative aspects of international tourism are well known, and many Sri Lankans are concerned about the social and cultural effects of tourism. These problems, however, are not unique to Sri Lanka.

RECENT CHANGES

Recent political and economic changes in Sri Lanka show a shift from a socialist to an entrepreneurial model of development. The lack of significant economic progress over the last two decades made such a shift welcome. However, it is important to be aware of what Sri Lanka has achieved since independence. Although in terms of gross national product (GNP) Sri Lanka is a poor nation, it can hardly be called poor if we look at its performance as measured by the Physical Quality of Life Index (POLI).²⁵ (Because GNP figures alone say little about life chances the POLI was developed to measure how nations perform in meeting the basic needs of its people.) In the early 1970's Sri Lanka's POLI performance exceeded the mean for nations classified as "upper-middle income," that is with GNP's five to ten times greater. "Sri Lanka provides the most dramatic example of a country that has been able to achieve remarkable life-quality results at startlingly low levels of income."²⁶ Its achievement was made possible by interrelated developments, including steady progress in income distribution and social justice, free educational and health services, and controlled prices and the distribution of essential food. All this ensured that even the very poor had food, health care and some education. The present strategy of passing on to private enterprise the obligations that the

state had for the most part assumed may endanger these gains.²⁷ One can hope that current strategies will build on the impressive gains of the past. ■

²⁷There are signs that the economy is overheated. Exacerbated inflation, "a disease which often accompanies hurried economic development," has become a part of Sri Lanka's current economic state. See *FEER*, September 11, 1981, pp. 46-49.

MONGOLIA: PAWN OF GEOPOLITICS

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The Mongolian Communist party and the government bureaucracy comprise an elite that travels extensively in the Soviet Union and East Europe, attending innumerable conferences and meetings and forming part of an international Communist web of beneficiaries of the system and of Soviet largesse. An ideological apparatus censors and controls publication and tries to control thought; it includes the Ministry of Culture, the party newspaper and the Writers Union.

Many Mongol men study in the U.S.S.R., and often they marry Russian women who return with them to Mongolia. In Mongolia, natives seldom marry Russians. Parallel rather than integrated Russian and native communities exist in Ulan Bator and other cities.

Of eight Mongolian Politburo members, three have served as chairman of Mongolia's Gosplan and two others have been the Mongolian representative to CMEA. Another Politburo member was director of the Economics Institute in Ulan Bator. Of three central committee party secretaries, one was former Minister of Agriculture and another was Minister of Light Industry. Most top officials were educated in the U.S.S.R. or served there for a considerable time in an official capacity. Fluency in Russian is the rule.

While the Soviet Union certainly exerts sufficient control over the Mongolian People's Republic to convert it into an integral part of the U.S.S.R., no such incorporation has taken place nor does it seem likely. Considerations delaying or blocking annexation include Mongolia's separate vote in the United Nations and a separate third world Asian voice for international communism and the fact that relatively few Russians live permanently in Mongolia and that it was not part of the Russian Empire before 1917. It has been a manipulated people's republic for more than 60 years, and it will probably continue as a people's republic for a long time. As the Russians put it in reporting on the Mongolian cosmonaut, "Recently our friendship rose to really cosmic heights." ■

THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF SOUTH ASIA

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area. Pakistani suspicions were confirmed when the 1976 Democratic party platform asserted that "India

⁶Quoted in Norman D. Palmer, "The United States and South Asia," *Current History*, April, 1979, p. 146.

has now achieved a considerable hegemony over the subcontinent . . . future American policy should accept this fact."⁶

In keeping with his party's platform, United States President Jimmy Carter improved relations with India, but the two countries remained at odds over nuclear proliferation and the presence of United States naval forces in the area. While relations with India have improved somewhat, relations with Pakistan have deteriorated substantially. Like India, Pakistan opposed the United States stance on nuclear nonproliferation. Largely because of its rivalry with India, Pakistan wants to increase its own nuclear option. Thus, in 1976, Pakistan signed a contract with France for the purchase of a nuclear reprocessing plant. The United States promised to supply Pakistan with conventional weapons, including 110 A-7's, in exchange for the cancellation of the project. Pakistan refused. Many Pakistanis believe that because of this refusal the United States encouraged the turmoil in Pakistan after the 1977 election and encouraged the subsequent coup.

The post-coup government, however, has continued Bhutto's nuclear policies. Although the French government cancelled the project in 1978, Pakistan continued its nuclear efforts, clandestinely working on a uranium enrichment and plutonium separation plant. This led to the cancellation of all United States assistance in 1979.

The Carter policy of disengaging from Islamabad to deter Pakistan from pursuing a nuclear program failed to produce the desired result by the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In the aftermath of this Soviet move, Washington offered Islamabad a two-year package of economic and military aid worth approximately \$400 million. Pakistan rejected this offer as inadequate, in view of the threats the country faced. Negotiations continued between the two countries, however, and led to a five-year economic and military aid sale, including the sale of symbolically important F-16 aircraft.

The new United States policy toward Pakistan is designed to serve several purposes. Washington hopes Pakistan's ability to resist Soviet pressure will increase. It is also expected that an increase in Pakistani capability will deter a Soviet attack on Pakistan. Increased Pakistani capability is expected to increase the threshold cost for any Soviet military operations against Pakistan by making any small attack a major operation. Washington also hopes that, unlike the policy of disengagement, the current policy will give it enough leverage to influence Pakistan's nuclear program. (Pakistan has been warned that United States assistance will be cut off if it explodes a nuclear device.) Washington also hopes that closer cooperation with Pakistan will lead to the coordination of policy between the two countries for the security of the Persian Gulf.

United States-Pakistani relations have improved be-

cause the United States has made a major effort to improve its power projection capability in the area in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion. The United States has more naval force in the Indian Ocean than the Soviet Union. In April, 1981, it had 17 combat ships, including a carrier, in the area; the Soviet Union had 5. Washington has also signed a cooperation agreement for the use of facilities with Kenya, Somalia and Oman. A United States satellite monitoring the Indian Ocean was launched in March, 1981.

From Washington's viewpoint, Pakistan has many assets in relation to the Gulf. It is part of the hinterland of the Gulf states. Pakistan itself has emphasized its relations with the Gulf states, especially since the 1971 war. It receives considerable economic assistance from the countries of the area, and several hundred thousand Pakistanis are employed there, remitting more than \$2 billion annually. The Gulf provides a growing market for Pakistani goods. And Pakistan has intensified its security ties with the Gulf states, in which it has several hundred military advisers. At the start of the Iraqi-Iranian war, Pakistan reportedly dispatched some 5,000 military personnel to Saudi Arabia. There have been several reports that as many as two Pakistani divisions might be stationed in the oil-rich kingdom. It has been argued that the Saudis needed Pakistan's trained, disciplined and non-Arabic-speaking military and nonmilitary personnel. However, the Saudis have apparently not made up their minds about the desirability of such a large Pakistani military presence.

The future of United States-Pakistani security cooperation in the Gulf is unclear. While Pakistan and several other states in the area, especially Turkey, can assist the United States in many plausible contingencies, Islamabad has ruled out any overt cooperation. Pakistani officials have stated that they will not allow United States facilities and bases on their territory and that Pakistan will remain in the nonaligned movement and a member of the Islamic conference. While some American officials have expressed interest in having access to Pakistani naval or land facilities, at present this has been ruled out.

While United States relations with Pakistan have improved, the opposite has been true in the case of India. Indian opposition to American arms sales to Pakistan and United States naval activities in the region has been more vocal than India's opposition to Afghanistan. The dominant Indian policy regards United States policy toward Pakistan as threatening Indian interests. New Delhi believes that Pakistan should accept a subordinate position to India in the subcontinent. American arms for Pakistan are regarded by many Indians as an American intrusion into the "Indian sphere of influence," and many Indians believe that

the current agreement will lead to a direct United States military presence in Pakistan. It is believed that American arms make Pakistan less accommodating to Indian wishes in the region and that the United States may directly support Pakistan in a war with India. Many Indians believe that Pakistan is using the Soviet invasion as an excuse to strengthen itself against India. Even those opposed to the United States sale of arms to Pakistan, however, do not regard a Pakistani attack against India as a rational option in the near future.

While the dominant Indian view is one of hostility to United States arms and United States naval forces in the area, a vocal Indian minority does not see a conflict of interest between India and the United States in the Persian Gulf⁷ and sees American arms to Pakistan as justified because of the Soviet invasion. Like the Pakistanis, Indian critics of the current government, especially the non-Communist opposition, believe that the Soviet invasion has changed the strategic environment, necessitating improved Indo-Pakistani relations. They argue that opposing a stronger Pakistan is not necessarily in the interests of Indian security. They point out that only Pakistan separates Soviet forces from India. Many Indians see this geographic noncontiguity from Soviet-occupied territories as a blessing and regard a strong independent Pakistan as an asset for long-term Indian security.

PAKISTAN AND INDIA

For its part, Islamabad has proposed a no-war pact between the two countries. Islamabad also proposed negotiations for troop reduction on the Indo-Pakistani borders and a nuclear-free zone in the region. Initially, Indian officials dismissed the Pakistani no-war pact proposal as a propaganda ploy aimed at gaining American congressional support for proposed economic and military aid. However, domestic and international pressure has forced the Indian government to change its mind, and the two countries have agreed to hold a series of meetings on the issue.

A friendlier Indian policy toward Pakistan would include a greater expression of sympathy for Pakistan's security problems, decreased opposition to Pakistan's arms purchases and increased pressure on the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan. So far, Gandhi has signaled in both directions, talking both about "clouds of war," and a no-war pact between the two countries. It is likely that once she makes up her mind, she will have the support of most Indians.

Uncertainty is also reflected in Indian policies toward the United States and the states of the region. Despite Indian protests against United States policy toward Pakistan, India seems interested in maintaining correct relations with the United States. Both countries want an amiable resolution of the continuing disagreement over the United States refusal to supply slightly

⁷Rajendra Sareen, "India and USA: Adversaries?" *The Hindustan Times*, December 24, 1981.

enriched uranium for India's Tarapur power plants.⁸ The United States is India's major trading partner and is an important source of technology. Correct relations with the United States give India the ability to influence United States policies. They also provide a degree of diplomatic flexibility.

Superpower interest in South Asia is likely to persist. The spread of the Afghan war, leading to a limited invasion or the (unlikely) massive invasion of Pakistan, would further strain relations between the superpowers and might well alter Indo-Soviet and Indo-United States relations. On the other hand, a political settlement of the Afghan issue, including a Soviet withdrawal, would dramatically decrease tensions in the area and between the superpowers. ■

⁸A. G. Noorani, "Indo-U.S. Nuclear Relations," *Asian Survey*, April, 1981, pp. 399-416.

AFGHANISTAN

(Continued from page 222)

mestic administration, the trade sector, the water, electricity and communications systems—and every other network—are all being redesigned to conform to the Soviet system. Those who do not cooperate are intimidated, harassed, imprisoned, executed or deported.¹⁵

There is no way to measure the costs to the Afghan people. The Soviet Union has been spending \$15 million a day to suppress the Afghan resistance. But the Soviet Union cannot win the war, although Western observers believe that the Soviet military cannot be defeated. Nonetheless, although some one-fifth of the population has been displaced, the resistance has intensified.

Attempts at a political solution have thus far failed. On July 6, 1981, British Foreign Minister Lord Carington sponsored an initiative calling for a two-stage international conference to resolve the Afghanistan question. The United Nations has also attempted to mediate, under the chairmanship of Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllare, and several scholars have proposed the possibility of Finlandization. The Afghanistan Freedom Organization has called for Soviet withdrawal and has suggested that United Nations troops be stationed in Afghanistan for a limited time until the Afghans elect a representative government.¹⁶ While the Soviet Union has not responded to these proposals, the European Parliament and most of the rest of the world, including the United States, commemorated March 21 (the first day of the Afghan New Year) as Afghanistan Day.

Meanwhile, Afghans are fighting all over the coun-

¹⁵Kamrany, "The Tragedy of the Afghan People," *Afghanistan Times*, vol. 2, no. 6 (July/August, 1981).

¹⁶See Selig S. Harrison's proposals for a political solution and responses to it in *Afghanistan Times*, vol. 2, no. 6 (July/August, 1981).

try to drive out the invading and occupying forces of the Red Army. The Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and the Afghan resistance represent a turning point in the history of Afghanistan. And it is most likely that this factor alone will dominate the Afghan scene over the next half century. ■

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

(Continued from page 224)

lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons are being used in Afghanistan, in violation of both the Geneva protocol of 1925 and the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972.

It is not possible to justify the Soviet actions in Afghanistan according to any meaningful interpretation of international law. The sole exception to the prescription against the use of force in international relations is provided for in Article 51 of the charter, which affirms "... the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations. . . ." But not even the Soviet Union itself has suggested that it has been the victim of an armed attack.

Moreover, it is hard to imagine how Afghanistan might conceivably have posed a threat to the Soviet Union. For decades the Soviet Union had proclaimed to the whole world, repeatedly, that its relations with Afghanistan were a model of peaceful coexistence, a prime example of neighborly relations between a small country and a big country, each with different systems of government and social structures but living together in peace without interference. Since 1921 the two countries had signed numerous treaties, affirming and reaffirming Moscow's respect for Afghanistan's independence and territorial integrity and promising non-interference in Afghan affairs. It should not be forgotten, furthermore, that Afghanistan was a member of the nonaligned movement and was not involved in any relationships that Moscow might look upon with concern.

How, then, could it have posed a threat? The argument is advanced that the Soviet Union felt threatened by the turmoil inside Afghanistan. But aside from student riots fomented by Babrak Karmal and his followers in 1965 and a brief period of unrest following the bloodless Daud coup in 1973, there was no turmoil at all in Afghanistan before April 27, 1978—before, that is to say, the Communists violently seized power in Kabul and, with the help of growing numbers of Soviet "advisers," began forcibly to impose upon the people of Afghanistan a foreign ideology and a totalitarian system.

It is also suggested by apologists for the invasion that the Soviet Union feared that a tide of Islamic fundamentalism might sweep from Afghanistan into its central Asian provinces. But even if this were true, it would hardly justify the Soviet invasion. In fact, the

Afghans are a devout people, but they have not tried to impose their beliefs on others, and historically they have allowed minority faiths to live peacefully within their midst. This attitude of tolerance is characteristic of the Afghans except when their faith itself is attacked, as it now is by communism. They are not tolerant, nor should they be, of an attack upon their freedom, independence, and identity, of which their religion is an important part. But there should be no doubt whatsoever that the threat in this instance is to—not from—the people of Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union also claims, of course, that its forces were invited in by the Kabul regime, which invoked its right to self-defense under Article 51. But so far, neither the Soviet Union nor the Kabul regime has produced a shred of evidence to prove that such an invitation was ever issued. It is hard to imagine what kind of evidence they could produce since, as we know, the invasion preceded the installation of Babrak Karmal, who wasn't even in Afghanistan at the time his predecessor was overthrown and killed by invading Soviet troops. Of late, Babrak Karmal has taken the line that the invitation was issued by the Afghan Communist Party. This, of course, is actually an admission that the invitation was not issued by any government.

The Kabul regime, moreover, has no legitimacy whatsoever in the eyes of the Afghan people. It exists only by virtue of Soviet actions and is, in fact, merely an appendage of Moscow. Soviet personnel direct virtually all aspects of its administration, including the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Interior, Information and Culture, Justice, and Economic Planning. Since 1979 Soviet personnel have also commanded the Afghan Army down to the brigade level and sometimes down to the company level. The Soviets even control Afghanistan's natural resources, in particular natural gas, which are extracted in a one-sided barter arrangement in exchange for goods used to sustain the Kabul regime.

Suspensions have been raised that the Kabul regime may also have acceded, in a treaty signed earlier this year, to the annexation by the Soviet Union of at least a part of the Wakhan corridor, the narrow strip of land that joins Afghanistan with China. A *de facto* annexation has already taken place since the area—from which the indigenous Kirghiz tribes have been forced to flee—is now under the control of the Soviet Army.

Given the Kabul regime's utter subservience to Moscow, it is hardly surprising that it should have no base of support among the Afghan people. It is propped up by 85,000 Soviet troops. Yet the freedom fighters—poorly armed and trained and virtually defenseless against some of the most sophisticated weapons in the Soviet arsenal—have been able to deny the Soviets control of perhaps 90% of the countryside and have made them contest many of the most important cities. In a desperate attempt to stem the disintegration of the

Afghan Army, the regime has offered many times normal pay to former enlisted men. Yet still they do not turn up, while draft-age men continue to slip out of the cities to join the resistance, and whole units of the army desert en masse. The regime has repeatedly offered amnesty to refugees who would return to Afghanistan from exile. Yet every week the refugee centers in Pakistan and Iran swell by the thousands.

What is clear today was clear in 1979. Then, as now, the Kabul regime was not threatened by an outside power, justifying defense under Article 51 but was, in fact, threatened by a popular uprising, a spontaneous popular uprising of the nation—of the people in whom nationhood inheres, and solely inheres, in the absence of a legitimate government. It was an uprising against a regime that had slaughtered its own people, destroyed their homes, sent almost half a million people fleeing into exile, and delivered the country to an alien force—an uprising that continues to this very day against the present regime and its Soviet masters.

It is this uprising and this uprising alone that is justified to invoke the right of self-defense, for it is defending the independence and very existence of the Afghan nation against a foreign and brutal domination.

Small wonder, then, that the Soviet Union is doing whatever it can to obscure the truth about Afghanistan. There is no other way to understand the charge—repeated by the Soviet Foreign Minister before this body in September—that the real source of the conflict in Afghanistan is foreign interference by the United States and China. This charge is ludicrous but also revealing, for it shows the lengths the Soviet Union is forced to go to conceal the real nature of its policy.

There are only two realities in Afghanistan today, the Soviet occupation and the Afghan nation, and neither is compatible with the other. The Soviet Union can conquer Afghanistan only by eliminating the Afghan nation. This the world must not permit to happen, for if Afghanistan is vanquished, no independent nation will be safe.

The draft resolution now before us, like its predecessors, seeks an end to the occupation of Afghanistan. It calls for:

- Immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops;
- Restoration of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and nonalignment of Afghanistan;
- Restoration of the right of the Afghan people to choose their own form of government and economic and social system, free from outside intervention, coercion, or restraint; and
- Return of the refugees to their homeland.

My government is firmly committed to these terms. The struggle of the Afghan nation for survival is consistent with the basic and most cherished purposes of

the United Nations, which are to protect national independence and to maintain world peace.

It is only fitting, therefore, that the United Nations should affirm the basic and most cherished purpose of the Afghan nation, which is to regain its ancient homeland so that it may once again be independent and live in peace.

General Assembly Resolution 36/34

The General Assembly,

Having considered the item entitled "The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security,"

Recalling its resolutions ES-6/2 of 14 January 1980 and 35/37 of 20 November 1980, adopted at the sixth emergency special session and the thirty-fifth session, respectively,

Reaffirming the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the obligation of all States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of any State,

Reaffirming further the inalienable right of all peoples to determine their own form of government and to choose their own economic, political and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever,

Gravely concerned at the continuing foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan, in contravention of the above principles, and its serious implications for international peace and security,

Noting the increasing concern of the international community over the continued and serious sufferings of the Afghan people and over the magnitude of social and economic problems posed to Pakistan and Iran by the presence on their soil of millions of Afghan refugees, and the continuing increase in their numbers,

Deeply conscious of the urgent need for a political solution of the grave situation in respect of Afghanistan,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General, particularly of the appointment of his Personal Representative,

Recognizing the importance of the initiatives of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the efforts of the Movement of Non-aligned Countries for a political solution of the situation in respect of Afghanistan,

1. *Reiterates* that the preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non-aligned character of Afghanistan is essential for a peaceful solution of the problem;

2. *Reaffirms* the right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of government and to choose their economic, political and social system free from

outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever;

3. *Calls* for the immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan;

4. *Also calls upon* all parties concerned to work for the urgent achievement of a political solution, in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution, and the creation of the necessary conditions which would enable the Afghan refugees to return voluntarily to their homes in safety and honour;

5. *Renews its appeals* to all States and national and international organizations to continue to extend humanitarian relief assistance, with a view to alleviating the hardship of the Afghan refugees, in coordination with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees;

6. *Expresses its appreciation* of the efforts of the Secretary-General in the search for a solution to the problem and requests him to continue these efforts with a view to promoting a political solution, in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution, and the exploration of securing appropriate guarantees for non-use of force, or threat of use of force, against the political independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of all neighbouring States, on the basis of mutual guarantees and strict non-interference in each other's internal affairs and with full regard for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep Member States and the Security Council concurrently informed of the progress towards the implementation of the present resolution and to submit to Member States a report on the situation at the earliest appropriate opportunity;

8. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-seventh session the item entitled "The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for internal peace and security."

The United States State Department Statement of November 19, 1981

Yesterday the U.N. General Assembly passed by a vote of 116 to 23 a resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. It also called for restoration of independence and self-determination to that beleaguered country and the right of the Afghan refugees to return.

The resolution passed by an even larger margin or majority than two similar resolutions adopted by the General Assembly in 1980 opposing Soviet aggression in Afghanistan.

This new action by the United Nations is a strong reaffirmation that the great majority of nations are unalterably opposed to this invasion and occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and demand a settlement based on withdrawal of Soviet troops and respect for international law. ■

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 223)

In *Afghanistan: Key to a Continent*, John Griffiths also traces the history of Afghanistan, the beginnings of Soviet penetration and the development of the political forces in Afghanistan that led to the Soviet invasion of 1979. The Soviet road-building program completed in 1966 linked Herat near the Soviet border with Kandahar to give the Soviet Union access through Pakistan to the sea. "Once the route was opened," the author points out, "the Russians had an even greater interest than . . . British India in the stability of Afghanistan." The growing and carefully planned Soviet involvement in the Afghan economy in the 1970's led to Soviet economic domination, while United States aid went into white elephant projects.

The attitudes of Afghanistan's neighbors, the frustration felt by the United States, and China's view of Afghanistan are all evaluated, and the alternatives for the West are outlined. The author urges Western leaders to gamble "on the innate Afghan spirit of independence," to try to secure the withdrawal of Soviet troops and to persuade the freedom fighters to recognize the Karmal regime. He suggests a joint Soviet-American declaration of non-interference and a guarantee of Afghanistan's neutrality, with the understanding that if the Soviet Union ever sends troops back into Afghanistan, that nation would become "the Poland of World War III." Meanwhile, according to Griffiths, the Soviet Union is training its troops in Afghanistan, which the author views as "the key to this region and the future of the continent as a whole." The maps and photographs are poorly reproduced and add little of value to this interesting account.

In *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective*, Anthony Arnold outlines "the progression from economic to political to military interference in order to establish Soviet control" over Afghanistan and suggests that this Soviet technique "is not limited to Afghanistan." Anthony Arnold was an intelligence officer in Afghanistan before the Soviet invasion, and he sees a consistent pattern in Soviet aggression there. Thus he traces the historical setting, the Soviet drive for economic and then political control, and the invasion and its aftermath—all in the context of cold-war Soviet expansionism. He urges the United States to arm the resistance fighters without becoming directly involved, and to declassify and make public current United States intelligence about events in that hapless country. At the same time, Arnold would like the United States to make it clear that its only interest is seeing Afghanistan become once again "a nationally free, truly nonaligned and independent country." This is an informative and

well-written albeit hard-line view of the Soviet Union and its intentions. O. E. S.

IN AFGHANISTAN'S SHADOW: BALUCH NATIONALISM AND SOVIET TEMPTATIONS. By Selig Harrison. (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981. 228 pages, notes and index, \$12.00.)

To the American reader who may not have been aware of the importance of Afghanistan half a decade ago, this realistic appraisal of the "Baluch card" will be welcome indeed.

A glance at the excellent 2-color maps in this sober study make the strategic importance of Baluchistan startlingly clear; the area of Baluchistan includes more than 900 miles of the Arabian Sea coastline including the northern shores of the vital Strait of Hormuz, and includes parts of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. Selig Harrison, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, offers an objective and realistic discussion of the volatile Baluch issue in the shadow of Soviet penetration of Afghanistan, the "steadily growing American involvement in Pakistan and the Persian Gulf area," and the fears and anxieties of India.

Harrison traces the history of the Baluchs, the emergence of Baluch nationalism in Iran and Pakistan, the guerrilla war for an independent Baluchistan, and the ambivalent role of the Soviet Union. Despite the danger, Harrison believes that "there is still a chance to avert a superpower confrontation over Baluchistan through restraint on both sides."

O. E. S.

PAKISTAN: THE ENIGMA OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT. By Lawrence Ziring. (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1981. 294 pages, selected bibliography and index, \$29.75.)

The growing strategic importance of Pakistan lends importance to this serious, informative work on Pakistan's internal development and dilemmas. In examining Pakistan's prospects for survival, the author examines the forces of nationalism, Islam, ethnic tensions, economic problems, government processes, and foreign policy.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein
University of Pennsylvania

PAKISTAN: ENERGY PLANNING IN A STRATEGIC VORTEX. By Charles K. Ebinger. (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1981. 155 pages, bibliography and notes, \$22.50.)

The author details the effects of the greatly increased costs of oil and products derived from oil, like fertilizer, on Pakistan, a country with a low per capita income and a 72 percent rural population.

He examines "the impact of the 1973-1974 oil price increases on Pakistan's development program and energy resource utilization patterns," the options available to Pakistan and the effects of energy needs on Pakistan's foreign relations. O. E. S.

CURRENT HISTORY ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DEVELOPING NATIONS. Edited by Carol L. Thompson, Mary M. Anderberg and Joan B. Antell. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1982. 395 pages, demographic tables, maps, photographs and index, \$45.00.)

The editors of this volume, all *Current History* editors, have asked specialists to evaluate 93 "developing nations in terms of the ways in which they satisfy the basic human needs of their citizens . . . with a focus on people under the pressure of economic development." Each of the 93 countries selected has a population of over 1 million people; the countries of East Europe with their centrally planned economies have been omitted.

Drawing on personal experience, every contributor shows the forces that have shaped each developing nation, describes the society, and evaluates the country's future prospects. Photographs, drawn largely from the photographic files of the United Nations, illustrate the text. The articles are brief and well written, and every country is introduced by a statistical table. The name and subject indexes are detailed and provide an excellent addition to this timely and useful volume, which should prove a valuable reference work for the student, the scholar, the traveler, or the inquiring executive. O. E. S.

THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN INDIA. By Arthur Lall. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981. 260 pages, appendix and index, \$16.95.)

Arthur Lall, the former Indian ambassador to the United Nations, has written about the emergence of India from its historic past to the present. He believes that, as always, the "problem facing India has been to discover a prescription for maintaining the Indian entity in the face of the continued glorification of military might and a readiness to use it to gain access to India by other major societies in the world." India must also avoid "being overwhelmed by the continuing morass of poverty [and] lack of education" and other "internal cancers." O. E. S.

INDIA: GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN A DEVELOPING NATION, 3d edition. By Robert Hardgrave Jr. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1980. 285 pages, references and sources and index, \$8.95 paper.)

This newly revised edition about the government and politics of modern India is an excellent source of information about the 700 million inhabitants of India. O. E. S.

A NEW HISTORY OF INDIA, 2d edition. By Stanley Wolpert. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. 472 pages, bibliography, glossary, maps and index, \$25.00.)

Stanley Wolpert asks whether "any government [of India], even with the best of motives and wisest of policies, [could] manage to solve the problems of the one-seventh of humankind we call Indian, who reside on barely two and a half percent of earth's domain, sharing less than one percent of the world's fortune." Attempting to provide answers to his query, he has summarized four thousand years of Indian history and India's current problems. The uncertain relationship between India and Pakistan is one of the more pressing problems, since both countries probably will have the facility to produce atomic weapons in the near future despite their repeated claims that they want nuclear plants only for peaceful purposes. This is an interesting book about India past and present. O. E. S.

THE INDIAN OCEAN IN GLOBAL POLITICS. Edited by Larry W. Bowman and Ian Clark. (Boulder Co.: Westview Press, 1981. 260 pages and index, \$25.00.)

In a period when the Indian Ocean Basin has assumed increasing importance, this collection of essays is particularly welcome. Regional and international perspectives are developed. The stress is on the military-strategic dimensions of superpower rivalry and the interests of littoral states like India and Iran. The analyses are of high quality. A. Z. R.

THE KURDISH QUESTION IN IRAQ. By Edmund Ghareeb. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981. 224 pages and index, \$22.00.)

The Kurds are a non-Arab, Muslim minority who pose a continuing threat to the internal stability of the Baath party dictatorship in Iraq. This useful, well-written study examines the origins, evolution and dynamics of Iraq's Kurdish question. The author's assessment is sound, though many may disagree that "the Kurds are unlikely to engage in another serious attempt to achieve independence by violence." A. Z. R.

ISLAMIC RESURGENCE IN THE ARAB WORLD. Edited by Ali E. Hillal Dessouki. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982. 274 pages, selected bibliography and index, \$27.95.)

The overthrow of the Shah brought new attention to Islam as a factor in the politics of the Arab East. This collection of 11 essays is an important contribution to our understanding of the meaning and significance of the contemporary resurgence of Islam. The case studies include analyses of the connection between religion and politics in Egypt, Syria, Libya and the nations of the Maghreb. A. Z. R. ■

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A Current History chronology covering the most important events of March, 1982, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Central American Peace Initiative

(See also *U.N.*; *U.S. Foreign Policy*)

March 5—In New York City, Mexican Foreign Minister Jorge Castañeda confers with U.S. Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. about Mexico's Central American peace initiative for El Salvador.

March 11—In a meeting with *New York Times* editor A. M. Rosenthal, Mexican President José López Portillo urges the U.S. to negotiate with Cuba, with Nicaragua, and with the factions in El Salvador.

March 22—Pursuing Mexico's peace initiative, Jorge Castañeda discusses the Mexican proposal in Managua; he has spent 2 days in Havana on the same errand.

European Economic Community (EEC)

March 11—Meeting in Brussels, the 10 EEC ambassadors agree on reducing their imports of Soviet goods by \$140 million; the EEC executive committee had recommended a \$350-million reduction.

March 30—At the conclusion of a 2-day meeting in Brussels, leaders of the EEC nations pledge an increase in economic aid to Central America and condemn Israeli repression in the West Bank.

Madrid Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

March 12—The Madrid conference adjourns for 8 months; the conference, which accomplished nothing during 16 months of meetings, is scheduled to reopen on November 9, 1982.

Middle East

March 17—670 U.S. soldiers arrive in the Sinai; they will join the Sinai peacekeeping force after April 25, when Israel completes its withdrawal.

March 26—U.S. Secretary of State Haig signs the documents that make the U.S. an official participant in the 11-nation Sinai peacekeeping force.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

(See also *U.S.S.R.*)

March 24—Meeting in Colorado Springs, Colorado, NATO defense ministers reject the Soviet proposal for a nuclear freeze in the deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles and agree to continue plans to deploy U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe "in the absence of a full intermediate nuclear force agreement" with the Soviet Union.

Organization of African Unity (OAU)

March 7—Morocco's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Abdelhaq Tazi, asks the OAU to reverse its February 28 decision to seat the Polisario Front as the representative of the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic (the Western Sahara). 19 OAU members walked out of the February meeting to protest the OAU's recognition of the Polisario Front.

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

March 20—Meeting in Vienna, OPEC oil ministers agree to cut their production by 700,000 barrels a day, of which 500,000 barrels will be cut by Saudi Arabia. The OPEC price of \$34 per barrel through the end of 1982 is reaffirmed.

March 26—It is reported that Saudi Arabia has threatened to cut off the supply of Saudi oil to any company that buys less Nigerian oil than it bought last week.

United Nations

(See also *Central American Peace Initiative*)

March 8—The United Nations Law of the Sea Conference opens in New York for what is hoped will be a final 8-week session; the U.S. returns to the conference with 43 pages of new demands about underseas mining.

March 16—Peruvian Alvaro de Soto, chairman of the committee of Asian, African and Latin American nations at the Law of the Sea Conference, says that these countries will not agree to any U.S. amendments to the underseas mining regulations.

March 25—During debate on Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega Saavedra, coordinator of the Nicaraguan junta, tells the Security Council that Cuba has authorized him to offer on its behalf "direct and frank" discussions with the U.S. to resolve the Central American crisis.

March 26—Mexican delegate to the U.N. Security Council Porfirio Muñoz Ledo reports that the U.S. and Nicaragua will hold talks "at a high political level" in Mexico City in April; the U.S. State Department says the "announcement is premature" and that no date has been set.

AFGHANISTAN

(See also *U.S.*, *Foreign Policy*)

March 14—President Babrak Karmal address the opening session of the first national conference of the Afghan Communist party; he asks the party's rival factions, the Parcham and the Khalq, to cooperate.

March 16—At the conclusion of the party conference, members vote to reinstitute a land expropriation program.

ARGENTINA

March 31—After widespread demonstrations against the government's austerity program, 400 protesters are arrested.

AUSTRIA

(See *Libya*)

BANGLADESH

March 24—Lieutenant General H. M. Ershad stages a coup d'etat and overthrows the government of President Abdus Sattar; Ershad suspends the constitution and declares himself martial law administrator.

March 26—More than 200 former government officials are arrested and charged with corruption, the misuse of power and anti-government activities.

CANADA

March 29—Queen Elizabeth II approves the Canada Act, giving Canada control over its own constitution.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

March 16—The government claims it successfully put down a coup attempt by opposition leader Ange Patasse on March 3.

CHILE

(See U.S., *Foreign Policy*)

CHINA

March 5—Minister of Public Security Zhao Cangbi says that all 4,237 former Kuomintang government and military specialists still in custody will be released soon.

March 8—The People's Congress approves Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang's proposal to streamline the bureaucracy; under his plan, the number of ministries and agencies will be reduced from 98 to 52 and the number of administrative employees will be reduced from 600,000 to 200,000.

March 14—The Central Committee of the Communist party and the State Council issue new directives to try to stem the rising birthrate.

March 26—First Deputy Premier Deng Xiaoping rebuffs Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev's March 24 offer to revive talks on improving Soviet-Chinese relations.

COLOMBIA

March 10—Armed forces chief General Gustavo Matamoros says that a suspect in the 1981 killing of U.S. missionary Chester A. Bitterman has been captured.

March 15—In Bogotá, *El Diario*, a leading newspaper, reports that in yesterday's elections the governing Liberal party won a majority in the National Congress.

March 17—President Julio César Turbay Ayala asks the Organization of American States (OAS) to establish an inter-American naval force to block the shipment of arms from Cuba and Nicaragua to other countries in Latin America. Colombia and Cuba broke off diplomatic relations in 1981 when Cuban officials admitted they were training Colombian anti-government guerrillas.

CUBA

(See Intl, *Central American Peace Initiative*; U.S., *Foreign Policy*)

EGYPT

March 6—A 3-judge military court gives death sentences to 5 of the 24 Muslim fundamentalists convicted of plotting to assassinate President Anwar Sadat; the others receive prison sentences ranging from one year to life.

March 27—President Hosni Mubarak orders the release from prison of 201 political prisoners detained by President Sadat.

EL SALVADOR

(See also Intl, *Central American Peace Initiative*; Nicaragua; U.S., *Foreign Policy*)

March 2—Government forces end a 10-day offensive

against anti-government guerrillas on the Guazapa range northeast of San Salvador.

In Washington, D.C., U.S. Secretary of State Haig says the U.S. has "overwhelming and irrefutable" evidence of non-Salvadoran support for the anti-government guerrillas.

March 4—In Washington, D.C., Secretary of State Haig says that a "Nicaraguan military man" who has been training guerrillas has been captured in El Salvador.

March 5—The "Nicaraguan military man" mentioned by Haig seeks asylum in the Mexican embassy in San Salvador. Identified as Legdamis Guitérrez Espinosa, he is described by Mexico as a student.

March 19—In Chalatenango Province, 4 Dutch journalists are murdered.

March 28—Nationwide elections are held to choose a 60-member constituent assembly that will prepare a new constitution and name a new government. Polling places in Usulután, the 3d largest city in the country, are closed by guerrilla forces; in most other areas, a heavy voter turnout is reported.

March 29—Early election returns from yesterday's presidential election give the moderate Christian Democratic party of President José Napoleón Duarte about 41 percent of the one million votes cast; of the 5 right-wing parties, the Nationalist Republican Alliance headed by Roberto d'Aubuisson wins 29 percent, the National Conciliation party led by Francisco José Guerrero wins 16 percent, the Democratic Action party led by René Fortín Magaña wins 10 percent, the Salvadoran Popular party and Popular Orientation party win smaller percentages.

March 31—The Central Elections Council reports that Duarte's Christian Democratic party has apparently won 24 of the 60 seats in the constituent assembly.

FRANCE

March 3—President François Mitterrand arrives in Jerusalem for a 2-day state visit.

March 12—President Mitterrand arrives in Washington, D.C., for talks with U.S. President Ronald Reagan.

GERMANY, EAST

(See *Poland*)

GREECE

March 1—In Cyprus, Prime Minister Andreas Papan-dreou completes a 3-day official visit with Greek Cypriot leaders.

GUATEMALA

March 7—Nationwide presidential elections are held.

March 9—The Electoral Commission announces that the government-backed candidate, General Angel Anibal Guevara, won about 35 percent of the popular vote and that National Liberation Movement candidate Mario Sandoval Alarcon won about 26 percent of the vote. Under the constitution, when a candidate does not have a majority of the popular vote the outgoing Congress selects the President.

March 12—By a vote of 39 to 13, the Congress names General Guevara President.

March 23—Rebel army officers led by retired army General Efraín Ríos Montt stage a bloodless coup d'état to restore "authentic democracy"; deposed President Romeo Lucas Garcia flees the country.

March 24—Leader of the 3-member military junta General Ríos Montt suspends the constitution and assumes

the post of Defense Minister. Junta member General Horacio Maldonado Schaad becomes Minister of Government and the other junta member, Colonel Jorge Luis Gordillo, becomes Minister of Communications and Public Works.

March 25—The junta annuls the results of the March 7 presidential elections; it claims the returns were fraudulent.

INDIA

March 15—In New Delhi, Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Dmitri F. Ustinov and 16 senior Soviet officers arrive for 6 days of talks with Indian officials.

March 19—Following the resignation of Assam Province chief minister K. C. Gogoi because he lacked a majority in the legislature, President Sanjiva Reddy dissolves the Assam legislature and appoints Prakash Mehrotra, a member of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's Congress party, to govern the province until new elections are held.

IRAN

(See also *Iraq*)

March 7—*The New York Times* reports that Israel, several West European countries, North Korea, Syria, Libya and the Soviet Union are supplying hundreds of millions of dollars worth of arms to the Iranian government to assist Iran in its war against Iraq. Israel is reported to be supplying or arranging for about half the arms.

March 9—An article in *Pravda*, the Soviet Communist party daily newspaper, says that Soviet relations with the Iranian government have deteriorated since the overthrow of Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlavi.

IRAQ

(See also *Lebanon*)

March 24—U.S. analysts report that on March 22 Iranian troops began a major offensive against Iraqi forces in the Suza-Dizful area of Khuzistan province.

March 30—President Saddam Hussein says his troops have withdrawn from their strongholds in Khuzistan province.

IRELAND

March 9—By a vote of 86 to 79, Parliament selects Fianna Fail leader Charles J. Haughey as Prime Minister; Haughey defeats Prime Minister Garret Fitzgerald of the Fine Gael party.

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Middle East; France; Jordan*)

March 3—In preparation for the April 25 return of the Sinai to Egypt, Israeli military forces begin removing militant Jewish squatters forcibly from the Israeli-occupied area of the Sinai; most of the permanent residents have agreed to leave their homes as soon as they are compensated for their property by the government.

March 18—In El Bireh in the West Bank, the Defense Ministry replaces Palestinian mayor Ibrahim Tawil with an army colonel; the locally elected council has refused to deal with the Israeli West Bank administration.

March 20—In El Bireh, fighting occurs between army soldiers and local residents for the 2d day as townspeople demonstrate violently against the March 18 government action.

March 22—In continuing violence in the West Bank, Israeli soldiers shoot and kill 1 Palestinian and wound 2 others; the West Bank general strike called by the Palestinians continues into its fourth day.

March 23—Following a tie vote in Parliament on a vote of confidence on his West Bank policies, Prime Minister Menachem Begin submits his government's resignation; the Cabinet rejects his resignation, 12 to 6.

March 25—In the West Bank, Palestinian protesters hurl a grenade into an army jeep and kill an Israeli army sergeant.

ITALY

March 25—President Sandro Pertini arrives in Washington, D.C., for talks with U.S. officials.

JAPAN

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

March 4—The government asks Taiwan to revoke its ban on the importation of 1,533 Japanese consumer items; the ban was imposed unilaterally in February.

March 12—A government spokesman reports that for the first time in 7 years the country's economic activity declined by slightly less than 0.9 percent in the final quarter of 1981.

March 29—Minister of International Trade and Industry Shintaro Abe announces that in fiscal 1983 the government will limit Japanese automobile exports to the U.S. to the fiscal 1982 level of 1.68 million.

JORDAN

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

March 13—The Defense Ministry publishes government orders declaring that any Palestinians living in the Israeli-occupied West Bank who cooperate with the Israeli village leagues rather than the elected Palestinian mayors will be prosecuted for treason.

KOREA, SOUTH

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

March 2—President Chun Doo Hwan reduces the life sentence of opposition leader Kim Dae Jung to 20 years in prison.

LEBANON

March 22—In Beirut, an under secretary of the Iraqi embassy, Ali Hajem Sultan, is assassinated.

LIBYA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

March 10—Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qaddafi arrives in Vienna, Austria, for a 4-day state visit and conferences with Austrian leaders.

MEXICO

(See *Intl, Central American Peace Initiative, U.N.; El Salvador*)

NAMIBIA (SOUTH-WEST AFRICA)

March 16—South African military officers report that on March 13 South African forces destroyed a major South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) staging post in southwestern Angola.

March 20—Angop, the Angolan press agency, claims that South African forces destroyed an Angolan refugee camp near the Namibian border, not a SWAPO base, on March 13.

NICARAGUA

(See also *Intl, Central American Peace Initiative, U.N.; El Salvador; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- March 9—Replying to U.S. charges that Nicaragua threatens other nations in the region, Sergio Ramírez Mercado, a member of the 3-man ruling junta, says that his country's military buildup is "exclusively defensive" and that "there is not a single foreign soldier in Nicaragua."
- March 10—*The New York Times* reports that senior officials in the U.S. have revealed a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency plan to provide millions of dollars in covert aid to moderate Nicaraguans to try to overthrow the Sandinist government.
- March 15—The government announces a 30-day state of emergency and charges that the U.S. CIA masterminded the March 14 destruction of two bridges by right-wing guerrillas.
- March 16—The junta places security forces on full alert, charging that the U.S. is plotting its overthrow.
- March 17—In a letter to U.N. Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, the Sandinist government protests U.S. breaches of Nicaraguan airspace.
- March 18—Sergio Ramírez Mercado says his government is ready to negotiate with the U.S., which continues to charge that Nicaragua sends arms to the Salvadoran rebels.
- March 21—The government says that it forcibly evicted the Miskito Indian population from land along the Honduran border earlier this year so that it could militarize the border to prevent incursions into northern Nicaragua by armed exiles.
- March 23—Diplomatic sources in Managua say that the U.S. and Nicaragua have agreed to resume direct negotiations.

PAKISTAN

- March 21—Following several anti-government street demonstrations in Lahore and Peshawar, the government bans political demonstrations in Lahore and establishes special military courts to try offenders.

POLAND

- March 1—Polish Communist party leader and Prime Minister General Wojciech Jaruzelski arrives in Moscow for an official 2-day visit with Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev; this is Jaruzelski's first trip outside Poland since martial law was declared in December, 1981.
- International Committee of the Red Cross president Alexander Hay says that he met recently with Solidarity trade union leader Lech Walesa "under satisfactory conditions."
- March 2—West German and Swiss bank officials delay rescheduling Poland's debt to Western banks because the Polish state bank still owes \$75 million in 1981 interest payments.
- March 3—An Interior Ministry spokesman announces that beginning March 15 those still interned under martial law may apply for permission to leave the country with their families.
- March 4—Interior Ministry official Colonel Hipolit Starszak announces that of the 4,000 people still in detention about a dozen have applied to leave the country.
- March 29—General Jaruzelski arrives in East Berlin for a state visit; he is greeted by East German leader Erich Honecker.

SOMALIA

- March 9—President Mohammed Siad Barre arrives in Washington, D.C., for talks with U.S. President Ronald Reagan and other government officials.

SOUTH AFRICA

(See also *Namibia; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- March 3—The ruling National party expels 16 members for refusing to support Prime Minister P. W. Botha's policies.

SURINAME

- March 12—Government forces put down a coup attempt by right-wing rebel leader Wilfred Hawker; Hawker is captured.
- March 13—Army commanders announce that Hawker was executed this morning.
- March 31—A civilian Cabinet is installed.

TURKEY

- March 2—The military government bans publication of *Arayis*, a weekly magazine owned by former Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit.
- March 16—Acting Foreign Minister Ilhan Oztrak concedes that 15 people have been tortured to death since the military came to power in 1980; Amnesty International has reported that more than 70 people have died from torture under the military government.

UGANDA

- March 1—The government expels the 2 remaining Western correspondents.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *Intl, EEC, NATO; China; India; Iran; Poland; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- March 16—In a speech to a Soviet trade union convention, President Leonid I. Brezhnev announces that his government is suspending the deployment of new nuclear missiles in the European Soviet Union. He warns that if NATO deploys American-made missiles in West Europe, the U.S.S.R. will put the U.S. "in an analogous position."
- March 31—In Moscow, it is widely rumored that Brezhnev has been hospitalized.

UNITED KINGDOM**Great Britain**

(See also *Canada*)

- March 2—The British National Oil Corporation reduces the price of its oil \$4 a barrel to \$31 a barrel.
- March 9—Chancellor of the Exchequer Geoffrey Howe presents his government's budget to Parliament; the budget calls for lower industrial taxes and a reduction in government borrowing.
- March 11—The government announces its decision to purchase the Trident 2 missile system from the U.S. to replace its own Polaris missiles. The U.S. system will cost the government \$14 billion over 18 years.

Northern Ireland

- March 25—In Belfast, 2 British soldiers are killed in an ambush by Irish Republican Army gunmen.

UNITED STATES**Administration**

- March 1—President Ronald Reagan says that he will not

send legislation to Congress to speed up the removal of federal restraints on the price of natural gas.

March 4—The Federal Communications Commission rules that up to 4,000 new low-power television stations (with a range of only 10 to 15 miles) may be licensed in the next 3 years; some 6,500 applications are already on file with the commission.

March 7—Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige says that his department will request an additional \$4.6 million in order to keep open 45 of the 75 weather stations scheduled for closing.

March 12—Director of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Anne M. Gorsuch announces the EPA's "national contingency plan" that establishes administrative procedures to reach decisions about the clean-up of toxic waste dumps; a 1980 law established a \$1.6-billion fund for such cleanups.

March 14—The EPA suspends its rule requiring manufacturers of hazardous wastes to report annually on the disposal of those wastes; each year, the agency will survey only 10 percent of the companies involved.

March 16—President Reagan exempts from Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments those colleges whose only federal aid takes the form of federally guaranteed loans to students; Title IX prohibits sex discrimination in educational programs receiving federal funds. It is expected that a similar exemption will be made in the case of Title VI, which prohibits racial discrimination.

March 22—Director of the Voice of America broadcasting network James B. Conkling resigns after 10 months; John Hughes is to replace him.

March 23—Addressing the National Conference of Christians and Jews in New York City, President Reagan says that "the facts prove" he cares for the needy; the conference has given him its Charles Evans Hughes Gold Medal for his leadership and humanitarian views.

President Reagan sends Congress his plan for establishing enterprise zones that will utilize "the market to solve urban problems." According to the plan, the Department of Housing and Urban Development will designate up to 25 zones a year; employers creating new jobs will receive local, state and federal tax benefits and concessions.

Economy

March 1—The Commerce Department reports that the index of leading economic indicators fell 0.6 percent in January.

March 5—The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that in February the unemployment rate climbed to 8.8 percent, equal to the December rate, the second highest rate since the beginning of World War II.

March 8—Chase Manhattan Bank and several other banks reduce the prime lending rate to 16 percent.

March 12—The Labor Department reports a 0.1 percent drop in the producer price index, the first decline since 1976.

March 19—The Department of Commerce estimates that in the first quarter of 1982 the nation's gross national product (GNP) declined at a 4.5 percent annual rate.

March 23—The Labor Department reports that consumer prices rose 0.2 percent in February.

March 30—The Commerce Department reports that its index of leading economic indicators declined 0.3 percent in February; revised figures show a 0.8 percent

decline in December, 1981, and a decline of 1.2 percent in January, 1982.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Inll, Central American Peace Initiative, Middle East, NATO, U.N.; El Salvador; France; Italy; Japan; Nicaragua; Somalia; U.S.S.R.*)

March 1—Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger tells reporters that before answering Jordan's request for new arms from the U.S. the U.S. must examine more closely the possibility that Jordan may try to acquire arms from the Soviet Union.

March 3—State Department spokesman Dean Fischer says that the U.S. is negotiating for the right to improve and use air bases in Colombia and Honduras.

March 8—Deputy Secretary of State Walter J. Stoessel Jr. tells the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that according to information provided by Afghan doctors trained by the Soviet Union in chemical warfare and by Afghan refugees in Pakistan, "3,042 deaths in 47 separate incidents . . . [in] 1979-1980" can be attributed to the use of chemical weapons by Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

March 9—Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Admiral Bobby R. Inman makes public aerial reconnaissance photographs supporting U.S. claims that, with Cuban and Soviet aid, Nicaragua is assembling the largest and best-equipped military force in Central America.

March 10—Testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General David C. Jones says that he can see no "circumstances under which we would intervene with United States forces" in El Salvador.

State Department spokesman Dean Fischer announces a U.S. ban on the import of Libyan oil and on the export of high technology exports to Libya because of Libya's support of terrorism and its "efforts to destabilize U.S. regional friends. . . ."

March 11—The State Department announces that its long-standing practice of refusing to admit high-ranking South African military personnel on official business has been abandoned; several South African military delegations have conferred in Washington, D.C., with Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester A. Crocker.

Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. calls the nuclear arms freeze proposal put forward by 17 Senators and 122 Representatives dangerous; he says it would "freeze the United States into a position of military disadvantage and dangerous vulnerability."

March 12—At a State Department news conference, Nicaraguan Orlando José Tardencillas refuses to repeat his earlier story about Cuban and Nicaraguan involvement with the guerrillas in El Salvador; he states that any statements he made about such involvement were made under duress. The State Department brought Tardencillas (who had been a prisoner in El Salvador for a year) to Washington, D.C., to support its charges of foreign intervention in El Salvador.

March 13—Tardencillas is turned over to the Nicaraguan Embassy in Washington, D.C.

March 15—At a news conference in New York City, Secretary of State Haig reveals proposals made to Mexican Foreign Minister Jorge Castañeda on March 14 to settle Nicaraguan-U.S. differences rising out of U.S. allegations that Nicaragua is aiding guerrilla forces in El Salvador. Yesterday, Castañeda said that the U.S.

proposals could make possible "a series of agreements" to bring normality to U.S., Cuban and Nicaraguan relations.

March 16—White House spokesman Larry Speakes calls Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev's proposal for a missile freeze in Europe "neither unilateral nor a moratorium . . . limited to the European Soviet Union, thus leaving the U.S.S.R. free to continue its SS-20 buildup east of the Urals."

March 17—President Reagan sends Congress his Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, a supplement to 1982 foreign aid appropriations; he asks for \$128 million in emergency economic aid for El Salvador out of a total of \$350 million in emergency aid for the Caribbean basin.

March 22—In a 32-page report sent to Congress and the United Nations, the State Department details its evidence that the Soviet Union and its allies have used chemical weapons in Laos, Cambodia and Afghanistan.

March 25—The State Department discloses that special State Department envoy General Vernon E. Walters met in Havana with Cuban leader Fidel Castro earlier this month to discuss alleged Cuban involvement in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Assistant Secretary of State Thomas O. Enders says that the U.S. is willing to enter into talks on this subject but doubts that talks alone will ease tensions.

March 26—In Tokyo, Defense Secretary Weinberger urges Japan to rearm sufficiently to undertake its own defense "within this decade."

March 28—Secretary Weinberger arrives in Seoul, South Korea, on a 3-day trip; he is expected to urge South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan to strengthen his commitment to human rights.

March 29—Secretary of State Haig calls the election in El Salvador "a military defeat for the guerrillas . . . [and] a victory we have all won."

March 31—In his 1st prime-time televised news conference, President Reagan says that because the Soviet Union holds "a definite margin of [nuclear] superiority," he will not support an early nuclear weapons freeze but will negotiate for a "dramatic" reduction in nuclear arms by both the U.S. and the Soviet Union while moving the U.S. toward parity.

Labor and Industry

March 1—Members of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters ratify a 37-month contract; wages of unionized truck drivers and warehouse workers will be frozen for two years; thereafter negotiations may resume.

March 3—The Business Roundtable's 46-member policy committee declares that the administration's budget deficit is unacceptable; the Roundtable is composed of chief executives of the nation's 200 major corporations.

March 15—The General Motors Corporation asks the United Automobile Workers to grant GM the same concessions it has granted to the Ford Motor Company, including a wage freeze.

Legislation

March 2—With a 57-37 vote, the Senate approves legislation that would eliminate the use of school busing to achieve racial integration; the bill goes to the House.

March 10—122 Representatives and 17 Senators spon-

sor a nonbinding resolution calling for a bilateral Soviet-American nuclear freeze.

March 18—The Senate votes 90 to 6 to approve a bill making it a crime to disclose the identity of an American intelligence agent involved in covert action overseas; the House has passed an almost identical bill. The bills go to a Senate-House conference.

March 20—President Reagan vetoes the bill giving him authority to allocate oil and establish oil prices in an emergency.

March 24—The Senate upholds the President's veto of the emergency oil allocation and price-fixing bill.

March 29—The Senate confirms Herman W. Nickel as ambassador to South Africa.

March 30—58 Senators endorse a nonbinding resolution calling for "equal and sharply reduced levels" in both Soviet and U.S. nuclear weapons.

Military

March 4—President Reagan names General John W. Vessey Jr. chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to succeed General David C. Jones, retiring July 1.

March 18—President Reagan names General Charles A. Gabriel air force chief of staff and Admiral James D. Watkins chief of naval operations.

March 19—The Defense Department announces a record \$114.5-billion rise in the estimated cost of 44 major weapons programs.

March 20—A White House aide reveals that on March 5 President Reagan signed a planning document calling for the production of some 380 nuclear warheads in addition to those projected by the administration of President Jimmy Carter. It is estimated by private analysts that plans call for the production of 17,000 warheads over the next 5 to 8 years.

Political Scandal

March 11—In the wake of his conviction on charges growing out of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Abscam inquiry, Senator Harrison A. Williams Jr. (D.N.J.) resigns his Senate seat. After 5 days of debate, the Senate had been preparing to vote to expel Williams.

March 25—Judge George C. Pratt affirms the bribery convictions of former Senator Williams and former Representative Michael J. Myers (D.,Pa.).

Science and Space

March 30—The space shuttle *Columbia* lands safely after 8 days in space.

Supreme Court

March 3—Ruling 8 to 0, the Supreme Court declares that a village ordinance regulating the sale of drug-related paraphernalia "simply regulates business behavior" and is not unconstitutional.

March 23—The Court divides 4 to 4 on the American Medical Association's appeal of a Federal Trade Commission order allowing physicians to advertise and compete for business. The even division automatically affirms the appellate court's decision allowing the competition although it does not establish a precedent.

Vietnam

March 31—The Vietnamese News Agency reports that 6 members of the Politburo, including General Vo Nguyen Giap, were removed on the last day of the 5th Vietnamese Communist party congress. ■

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